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SHAREHOLDER ACCESS TO THE 
PROXY REVISITED 
Jayne W. Barnard* 
We have an interesting situation in which large institutions are re-
jecting the old Wall Street rule because their holdings are [now] 
large enough that it makes economic sense for them to spend time 
and money protecting the governance power associated with their 
shareholdings .. .. In the future, you'll . .. see pension funds be-
coming even more aggressive in perhaps nominating their own can-
didates for boards of directors and asking more pointed, specific 
questions about the operation of the corporation. 1 
One of the goals underlying the enactment of the Securities Exchange Act 
of 19342 was to reduce management's domination of corporate boards of 
directors. In enacting Section 14 of the Exchange Act, 3 Congress hoped to 
ensure shareholders an informed and constructive role in the selection and 
oversight of corporate directors. 4 The Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion's (SEC or Commission) application and enforcement of Section 14 has 
only partially achieved that result. Investors now receive comprehensive in-
• B.S. University of Illinois; J.D. University of Chicago; Associate Professor of Law, 
Marshall-Wythe School of Law, The College of William & Mary. I am especially grateful for 
the assistance of Melvin Eisenberg, Mortimer Caplin, Kurt Wulff, Virginia Rosenbaum of the 
Investor Responsibility Research Center, Jamie Heard of Analysis Group Inc., Richard H. 
Koppes and Kayla Gillan of the California Public Employees Retirement System, and Nell 
Minow of Institutional Shareholder Services, Inc. In addition, I acknowledge the contribu-
tions of the faculty members at the Marshall-Wythe School of Law who participated in a 
work-in-progress workshop in September 1989, especially Alemante Selassie. Scott Finkel-
stein, William & Mary '90, and Stephanie Stakem and Charles Phillips '92, provided research 
support for this project. 
I. Economic Reasoning Changing Direction of SEC Deliberations. Grundfest States, 22 
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No.6, at 209 (Feb. 9, 1990) (quoting former SEC Commissioner 
Joseph Grundfest). 
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78KK (1988). 
3. /d. § 78n. 
4. See infra note 51 and accompanying text; see also SEC v. Transamerica, Inc., 163 F.2d 
511, 518 (3d Cir. 1947), cert. denied. 332 U.S. 847 (1948) ("It was the intent of Congress to 
require fair opportunity for the operation of corporate suffrage. The control of great corpora-
tions by a very few persons was the abuse at which Congress struck in enacting Section 
14(a). "). 
37 
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formation on board candidates and their backgrounds. ~ They are not, how-
ever, significantly involved in matters of corporate governance. 
There are sound economic and behavioral reasons why many shareholders 
do not take an active role in the selection and oversight of top management. 6 
But, contrary to the assertions of those who disparage "corporate democ-
racy" as a fanciful and largely empty notion, 7 some shareholders do actively 
seek to participate in governance matters and have relevant expertise to 
bring to the process. Ironically, accumulated actions of the SEC have ex-
cluded these shareholders from playing an effective governance role. Not 
only has the SEC limited the means by which shareholders may initiate dia-
logue on governance matters, it also has failed to support shareholders seek-
ing to participate in the selection of their own fiduciaries. 8 
Shareholders in large publicly held companies, while nominally empow-
ered under state law to elect the directors who will represent their interests,9 
are systematically deprived of two significant opportunities: they are neither 
permitted to play a meaningful role in the selection of directoral candidates, 
nor to choose among competitive candidates for scarce board positions. 
A typical proxy ballot will list, for example, ten "official" candidates for 
ten board seats. Generally, either the incumbent board or a nominating 
committee comprised primarily of outside directors selects the nominees. 
Those nominees who are suggested by shareholders-even substantial and 
well-informed shareholders-but who are not favored by incumbent man-
agement do not appear on the ballot, 10 nor does management provide any 
opportunity to choose among its "approved" candidates. 
On rare occasions, shareholders are provided a choice among directoral 
candidates. During the infrequent proxy fight, 11 an insurgent faction may 
organize its own slate of candidates and present the names of these candi-
dates for shareholder consideration in documents separate from those pre-
5. See infra note 85 and accompanying text. 
6. See infra notes 259-62 and accompanying text. 
7. See infra notes 29, 234 and accompanying text. 
8. See infra notes 13-15, 213-29 and accompanying text. 
9. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit . 8, § 216(3) (1983). 
10. Cf Seligman, A Sheep in Wolf 's Clothing: The American Law Institute Principles of 
Corporate Governance Project, 55 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 325, 331 (1987) ("nomination of direc-
tors by anyone other than incumbent management [is now] virtually impossible" ). 
II. According to a study published by the Investor Responsibility Research Center 
(IRRC), during the 1989 proxy season there were only 20 proxy contests, of which 12 were 
pursued to conclusion, in a population of over 15,000 public companies. Lieberman & Cobb, 
Proxy Contests Fewer, Quieter in /989, 6 IRRC CORP. GOVERNANCE BULL. 106 (July/Aug. 
1989). During the 1988 season there were only 30 proxy contests. /d. 
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pared by management. The routine application of "shareholder 
democracy," however, is anything but democratic. 12 
Federal law supports this tradition of the self-perpetuating board. SEC 
rule 14a-8, the "shareholder proposal rule," 13 provides that shareholders 
holding at least $1000 or 1% of a corporation's stock, whichever is less, 14 
may advance and circulate to other shareholders at the corporation's ex-
pense certain categories of generally innocuous proposals. The rule specifi-
cally excludes, however, proposals relating to an "election to office."1s 
Thus, this rule denies a non-management shareholder, regardless of the ex-
tent of the shareholder's ownership or the merits of the shareholder's nomi-
nee, a practical mechanism for nominating even a single directoral 
candidate. 
The shareholder may lobby the board of directors or its nominating com-
mittee, but little incentive exists for those men and women to upset their 
existing organizations. 16 Alternatively, the shareholder may choose to un-
dertake an independent proxy solicitation, which with legal, printing, and 
professional solicitation fees may often cost millions of dollars, 17 with only a 
scant chance of reimbursement.18 Only someone mounting an out-and-out 
contest for control is likely to assume this expense. Coupled with the spe-
cific complicity of the SEC, the process of directoral selection remains, as it 
was before 1934, the exclusive preserve of corporate management. 
Directoral selection appears to be of particular importance to institutional 
investors. Some institutions routinely attempt to influence the board compo-
sition of corporations in crisis, 19 and others cast "no" votes against manage-
12. Cj E. EPSTEIN, WHO OWNS THE CORPORATION 13 (1986) ("(Corporate elections) 
are procedurally much more akin to the elections held by the Communist party of North 
Korea than those held in Western democracies."). 
13. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (1990). 
14. /d. § 240.14a-8(a)(l). 
1 S. /d. § 240.14a-8(c)(8). 
16. One respondent to a recent survey of corporate directors remarked that "as an incum-
bent, independent director, why should I be pleased to be ousted?" For a description of this 
survey, see infra note 77 and accompanying text. 
17. Challenger Harold Simmons spent more than $6 million for advertising, printing, 
postage and proxy solicitation services in his 1990 proxy fight for control of Lockheed Corpo-
ration. Lockheed spent more than $8 million responding to Simmons' challenge. Pender, Big 
Lockheed Investors Fare Well, San Francisco Chron., Mar. 30, 1990, at Cl, col. 2. 
18. See generally Machtinger, Proxy Fight Expenditures of Insurgent Shareholders, 19 
CASE W. RES. 212 (1968) (discussing the difficulty insurgent shareholders face in getting reim-
bursed for costs of proxy fights). 
19. See, e.g., O'Hara, Texaco Accepts Director Nominated by Shareholders, 6 IRRC CORP. 
GOVERNANCE BuLL. 6 (Jan./Feb. 1989) (institutional investors instrumental in placing John 
Brademas on the board of Texaco after it entered Chapter II and shareholder Carl lcahn had 
undenaken a contest for control); Pension Funds Urge Changes by Oil Firms. Wash. Post, July 
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ment's proposed directoral slates in protest against undesirable management 
policies. 20 In addition, some institutions seek to persuade board members to 
take specific actions, such as the dismissal of a chief executive officer, with 
the implicit understanding that board replacement is a possible remedy for 
noncompliance with their wishes.21 They have even attempted to intercede 
in board deliberations concerning executive succession. 22 In a recent proxy 
fight at Lockheed Corporation, some institutional shareholders effectively 
"sold" their vote to management in exchange for the right to name up to 
three members of the Lockheed board.23 Many institutions are now seeking 
access to the proxy24 to regularize their directoral selection role. 
These investors believe it is possible that empowering institutional share-
holders to nominate and effectively solicit votes for their own directoral can-
didates could produce significant benefits. First, access to the proxy might 
reduce the antagonism between incumbent management and significant in-
vestors which results from sporadic and often contentious communication. 
Second, access might enrich the process of decisionmaking by ensuring that 
the board of directors has diverse points of view and is regularly apprised of 
the concerns of knowledgeable key investors. Finally, access to the proxy 
might reduce the likelihood-greatly feared by management-that key in-
vestors will tender into the first premium offer presented to them; having 
placed a trusted nominee on the board, these investors might be more likely 
5, 1989, at B2, col. I (citing efforts of members of the Council of Institutional Investors to 
place an environmental expert on Exxon's board of directors); see also Cogan, Shareholder 
Campaign on Environment Spreading, 6 IRRC CORP. GOVERNANCE BULL. Ill (July/ Aug. 
1989) (two major institutional investors urge six petrochemical companies to name an environ-
mentalist to their boards). 
20. See, e.g., Lieberman, Election of Directors, Shareholder Proposals Relating to the Board 
and Selection of Auditors: 1989 Background Report J, IRRC CORP. GOVERNANCE SERV. J-2-
5 (March 1989) (stating that half of institutional investors surveyed in 1988 reported voting 
against incumbent nominees for various reasons, including: approving greenmail or other anti-
takeover devices, where "inside" representation on the board was excessive, for poor attend-
ance or conftict of interest, or where all nominees were white males); see also O'Hara, New 
York, Pennsylvania Funds Scrutinize Corporate Boards, 6 IRRC CORP. GovERNANCE BLILL. 
143 (Sept./Oct. 1989) (the New York State Common Retirement Fund withheld votes from 60 
board slates-representing 10% of its portfolio-during 1989 because they were not made up 
of a majority of outside directors). 
21. E.g., Rose & Hilder, Mounting Junk Woes Imperil First Executive and Chief Fred 
Carr, Wall St. J., Jan. 29, 1990, at I, col. 6. 
22. White, GM Board Gets Letters From 2 Funds Concerned About Firm's Performance, 
Wall St. J., Jan. 9, 1990, at A4, col. I. 
23. Simmons Loses, But Lockheed Shareholders Win, San Francisco Chron. , Apr. II, 
1990, at Cl, col. I. 
24. "Access to the proxy," as used throughout this Article, refers to access for purposes of 
directoral nomination. This term has been used elsewhere to include shareholder communica-
tions unrelated to directoral nomination. See infra note 184 and accompanying text. 
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to accept management claims of a profitable long-term strategy than to cash 
out for a short-term gain. 25 
Both contractarian scholars and mainstream corporate managers oppose 
the idea of institutional access to the proxy. Contractarian scholars regard 
the idea as inconsistent with the e~onomic nature of the firm, and corporate 
managers regard most shareholders, particularly institutional shareholders, 
as so transfixed with "short-termism" that they are inappropriate partici-
pants in long-term governance decisions. 26 While these managers tradition-
ally tolerate creditor selection of directors, 27 shareholder selection 
apparently is less palatable, presumably because it is not accompanied by an 
infusion of new cash. 
Thinking about access to the proxy for purposes of directoral nomination 
provides an opportunity to reconsider the value and the contours of corpo-
rate democracy in the 1990's. Shareholders are told that they may seldom 
play a direct role in governance decisions because state law entrusts these 
decisions to members of the board, 28 while the SEC rules exclude them from 
any meaningful role in the selection of that board. There is little wonder 
25. Institutions-particularly public pension funds-are often exhorted to consider long-
term values, rather than seeking short-term profits, in order to minimize the impact of corpo-
rate debt on national competitiveness, alleviate the personnel dislocations which follow many 
takeovers, and help preserve the integrity of the capital markets. See, e.g., GovERNOR'S TASK 
FORCE ON PENSION FUND INV., NEW YORK STATE INDUS. COOPERATION COUNCIL, OUR 
MONEY's WoRTH 27 (1989) (urging the New York State pension funds to act as "patient 
investors"). 
26. Corporate lawyer Joseph H. Flom has stated that institutional investors have a "IS-
minute attention span." Their participation in corporate governance would be a "disaster." 
Opinions Differ Widely on Institutions' Role in Corporate Governance, 4 Corp. Couns. Weekly 
(BNA) No. 49, at 8 (Dec. 13, 1989). Citicorp's CEO John Reed views institutions with similar 
disdain: 
The interest of an institutional investor is too short-term. You know, all you would 
need on my board is three big funds that own 25 percent of my stock, and hell, they'd 
have me selling off the [credit] card business, which is worth a lot of money. Hell, 
those guys would sell it off, and they wouldn't care if it was there the next morning, 
because they would have sold their [stock] position. 
Andrews, Deconstructing the Mind of America's Most Powerful Businessman, MANHATTAN, 
INC., May 1990, at 69. 
27. See generally Note, Equitable Subordination and Analogous Theories of Lender Liabil-
ity: Toward a New Model of "Control," 65 TEX. L. REV. 801, 822 (1987) (citing loan clauses 
permitting the lender to select directors or officers); Comment, Insights Into Lender Liability: 
An Argument for Treating Controlling Creditors as Controlling Shareholders, 135 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1321, 1337 (1987) (citing lender's change-in-management clause permitting it to call 
substantial loan in the event board approves "unacceptable" management). It is very common 
for bankers to serve on the boards of client corporations. See D. KOTZ, BANK CONTROL OF 
LARGE CORPORATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES Appendix 8 (1978). 
28. E.g., Paramount Comms., Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990). 
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that shareholder voting is so easily discounted as a cumbersome fiction, ex-
cept in the context of contested takeover battles. 29 
This Article explores the rule excluding directoral nomination from the 
cost-sharing advantages of rule 14a-8, and the exclusionary tradition which 
the rule supports. It then reconsiders the alternative of permitting at least 
some shareholders to make direct nominations of directoral candidates, with 
the particulars of nominating and supporting information to be included in 
management's proxy at the corporation's expense. 30 Part I of this Article 
briefly examines the historical directoral selection practices which led to the 
enactment of the proxy provisions of the Exchange Act. Part II reviews two 
mechanisms which developed independently of the Exchange Act-cumula-
tive voting and the "independent nominating committee," both of which had 
the potential to facilitate shareholder involvement in directoral selection, but 
failed to achieve that result. In Part III, this Article analyzes various access 
to the proxy proposals advanced by the SEC, and by commentators from 
many disciplines, as supplements to cumulative voting and the committee 
nominating process. If adopted, these proposals would afford shareholders 
the right to nominate directoral candidates and share the costs of nomina-
tion with other shareholders. Part IV reviews the role played by the SEC 
and its staff, which has alternately promoted and discouraged shareholder 
access to the proxy. 
Part V of this Article considers the policy arguments in opposition to and 
in favor of access to the proxy and explores some of the logistical problems 
inherent in any workable access proposal. Finally, Part VI advocates an 
access to the proxy regulation that would recognize a role in directoral selec-
tion for substantial shareholders with some demonstrated long-term com-
mitment to a public company, provide a structure for these shareholders to 
share with other shareholders the cost of advancing the candidacies of the 
directoral nominees of their choice, and distinguish the essentially benign 
nature of directoral nomination by these shareholders from the more preda-
tory efforts of those shareholders whose goal is to transfer managerial con-
trol in its entirety. 
The benefits of this proposal are likely to be threefold. First, it will stimu-
late those involved in existing directoral selection practices, generally board 
nominating committees, to be more inclusive and less parochial in their 
29. See Fischel, Organized Exchanges and the Regulation of Dual Class Common Stock, 
54 U. CHI. L. REV. 119, 134 (1987). 
30. This reconsideration is timely, in light of indications that the SEC has undertaken a 
review of the entire proxy solicitation process. As Proxy Use Widens, New Rules are Urged, 
N.Y. Times, June 15, 1990, at Dl, col. 3 (various groups' petitions for a comprehensive review 
of the proxy voting system are being given "serious consideration" by the Commission). 
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searches for candidates for board positions. 31 Second, it will lead to an 
elected board characterized by increasingly diverse backgrounds and loyal-
ties, with a consequent impact on directoral decisionmaking likely to be of 
value to shareholders. 32 Third, it will lead to enhanced share value. 33 
This Article concludes that shareholder voting is both practical and im-
portant beyond the boundaries of the takeover market. Shareholder voting 
can constructively influence the basic governance structure of public compa-
nies and their share values, even in the absence of a takeover threat, and even 
in the presence of the traditional problems of collective action and uncom-
pensated voter choice. This view of·shareholder democracy goes beyond im-
precise, though tantalizing, analogy to the public electoral process. 34 It 
regards as important, both economically and psychologically, the process of 
consensual decisionmaking, the value of managerial diversity, and the restor-
ative powers of competition. 
I. THE ORIGINS OF THE SHAREHOLDER PARTICIPATION STATUTE 
In the years leading up to the Great Crash of 1929, managers of large 
public companies seldom concerned themselves with shareholder relations: 
Unfettered by external restraints such as active shareholder partici-
pation or supervisory regulatory agencies, directors managed with 
virtually no duty to account for their actions. Corporate corrup-
tion ran rampant as a result. Insider trading scams and fraudulent 
corporate reporting, designed to entice purchases of bogus stock, 
became commonplace. Finally, in the early twenties, companies 
began to experiment with what one critic terms "the crowning in-
famy of all," the issuance of non-voting [common] shares. The 
corporation could easily deny the shareholder the right to vote and 
thereby solidify its authority by issuing non-voting shares. Several 
dramatically inequitable transactions occurred as a result. 35 
Though the New York Stock Exchange ultimately responded to this par-
ticular form of abuse by enacting its one common share/one vote rule in 
1926,36 other abuses continued and new ones soon emerged. In his impas-
31. See infra note 77 and accompanying text. 
32. See infra notes 251·55 and accompanying text. 
33. See infra note 329 and accompanying text. 
34. See infra notes 381·83 and accompanying text. In public democratic theory, the exist· 
ence of competing factions is a given. See J. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND 
DEMOCRACY 269 (1943) ("[Democracy is] that institutional arrangement for arriving at polit· 
ical decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive 
struggle for the people's vote."). 
35. Simons, The Effect of Dual Capitalization on the Shareholder: Voting Rights Come 
Full Circle, 28 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 841, 849 (1988). 
36. J. LIVINGSTON, THE AMERICAN STOCKHOLDER 172, 186·87 (1958). 
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sioned condemnation of disenfranchising corporate practices common in the 
mid-1920's, 37 Harvard's William Z. Ripley noted widespread use of pyrami-
dal holding companies, 38 statutory abrogation of shareholder preemptive 
rights, 39 exclusive distribution of non-voting preferred shares to the public 
with voting control retained by management,40 substitution of non-voting 
preferred shares for voting preferred shares,41 and numerous examples of 
obfuscatory disclosure. 42 
During this period, shareholders enjoyed little, if any, meaningful role in 
the selection of corporate directors. The "overwhelming majority" of stock-
holders were " 'little people,' that is, members of the investing public who 
own small blocks of stock, who know little or nothing about the corporate 
activities; whose advice is not sought in running the corporation and proba-
bly would be worth little if it were given."43 These shareholders found at-
tendance at annual meetings to voice complaints or to vote their interests 
impractical; accordingly, the tradition of tendering proxies to management 
selected representatives evolved. 
In theory, proxy voting was a courtesy that corporate managers extended 
to shareholders to facilitate shareholder participation in corporate govern-
ance. In practice, managers selected proxy holders, made their services 
available to shareholders, and directed the proxy holders to cast their 
votes-ostensibly on the shareholders' behalf-as directed by the managers 
who appointed them. As Adolph Berte and Gardiner Means described it, 
"since the proxy committee [was) appointed by the existing management, 
the latter [could] virtually dictate their own successors."44 William 0. 
Douglas complained that, because of this practice, most corporate boards of 
this era, even those purporting to some level of independence, were "con-
trolled or dominated by the managers. "4s Often, Douglas said, corporate 
managers enjoyed a "feudal tenure."46 
37. W. RIPLEY, MAIN STREET AND WALL STREET (1927). 
38. /d. at 317. 
39. /d. at 39. 
40. /d. at 124. 
41. /d. at 125. 
42. /d. at 162-83. The use of voting trusts as a disenfranchising device was also common. 
Loomis & Rubman, Corporate Governance in Historical Perspective. 8 HoFSTRA L. REv. 141, 
153 (1979). 
43. Berle, Stockholders: Their Rights and Duties, HANDBOOK OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRA· 
TION 374, 374-75 (1931), quoted in Loomis & Rubman, supra note 42, at 143. 
44. A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 87 
(1932). 
45 . Douglas, Directors Who Do Not Direct, 47 HARV. L. REV. 1305, 1307 (1934). 
46. W. DOUGLAS, DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE 16 (1940). 
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Many proposals-ranging from increased disclosure to mandatory outside 
directors-were advanced during this period to enhance "shareholder pro-
tection" generally and to increase the shareholders' oversight role specifi-
cally.47 In a particularly prescient recommendation, Adolph Berle 
encouraged institutional shareholders-at that time made up primarily of 
insurance companies and banks holding depositors' stock in trust-to assem-
ble in a "permanent protective committee" to represent shareholder interests 
in the face of managerial abuses. 48 
Institutional holders, however, were reluctant to undertake this role. Typ-
ically, when dissatisfied with managerial performance, institutional investors 
followed the "Wall Street Rule," selling their stock rather than engaging in 
costly and generally futile efforts at reform. Cultural norms in the financial 
community reinforced the notion that attacking management was ungentle-
manly.49 Consequently, few proxy fights or contests for corporate control 
occurred during the period preceding the Exchange Act. 50 As a result, insti-
tutional engagement in the governance of publicly held corporations was un-
common, and mechanisms of participation, other than physical 
representation at shareholders' meetings, were nonexistent. 
When Congress passed the Exchange Act to authorize a federally regu-
lated uniform proxy solicitation process, it considered these practices and 
broadly empowered the SEC to develop rules encouraging shareholder par-
ticipation in governance matters. 5 1 When Congress chose not to leave proxy· 
47. See generally Loomis & Rubman, supra note 42, at 171-79 (describing the "corporate 
reform" proposals of the 1930's). 
48. A. BERLE, STUDIES IN THE LAW OF CORPORATION FINANCE 39 (1928). 
49. See generally J.R. EHRLICH & B.J. REHFELD, THE NEW CROWD-THE CHANGING 
OF THE JEWISH GUARD ON WALL STREET (1989) (describing the shifting emphasis in invest-
ment banking from carefully negotiated transactions and nurturing long-term business rela-
tionships to hostile "megadeals" and high-risk trading in the period 1945-1989). 
50. Cf. C. HENDERSON & A. LASHER, 20 MILLION CARELESS CAPITALISTS 75 (1967) 
("There were only a handful of cases in corporations of any kind where small stockholders got 
together to battle entrenched management and directors, and only one or two in which they 
won."). 
51. SeeS. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 12, 77 (1934). 
Fair corporate suffrage is an important right that should attach to every equity 
security bought on a public exchange. Managements of properties owned by the 
investing public should not be permitted to perpetuate themselves by the misuse of 
corporate proxies .... [T]he proposed bill gives the ... Commission power to control 
the conditions under which proxies may be solicited with a view to preventing the 
recurrence of abuses which have frustrated the free exercise of the voting rights of 
stockholders. 
H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13-14 (1934). 
A comprehensive review of the legislative history of Section 14 of the Exchange Act appears 
in Ryan, Rule Ua-8, Institutional Shareholder Proposals, and Corporate Democracy, 23 GA. L. 
REV. 97 (1988). Professor Ryan's conclusions concerning Congress' intent in enacting Section 
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solicitation issues to state oversight, it declined the opportunity to focus ex-
clusively on exchange regulation and disclosure requirements in the new is-
sue market. That Congress specifically addressed shareholder voting as an 
object of regulatory attention suggests a commitment both to suffrage and to 
participatory directoral selection as important elements of public policy. 
This view would have been consistent with the idea that highly placed busi-
ness leaders had transformed public companies into private governments. s2 
II. Two DEVICES WHICH HAVE FAILED TO STIMULATE 
SHAREHOLDER PARTICIPATION-CUMULATIVE VOTING AND 
THE INDEPENDENT NOMINATING COMMITTEE 
Many commentators have proposed schemes designed to magnify the 
voice of shareholders in corporate governance discourse and to improve 
management accountability to shareholders. Modest proposals include 
mandatory cumulative voting and the use of a board nominating committee 
comprised solely of independent, though incumbent, directors. 
A. Cumulative Voting 
Cumulative voting, a venerable and simple means of facilitating share-
holder involvement in directoral selection, developed out of the impassioned 
advocacy of Joseph Medill, publisher and editor of the Chicago Tribune 
from 1855 to 1899.s3 Medill, an influential delegate to the Illinois Constitu-
tional Convention in 1870, was enamored with the political philosophy of 
John Stuart Mill who embraced the notion of minority, or "proportionate," 
representation in elected legislatures. s4 While successfully arguing for pro-
portionate representation in the election of representatives to the Illinois 
General Assembly through cumulative voting, Medill also encouraged cu-
mulative voting in private corporations. ss Illinois adopted a mandatory cu-
mulative voting provisions6 that became the model for many states. 
Proponents of cumulative voting argued that minority representation on 
the board would lead to thoughtful discussions of controversial governance 
matters and permit early detection and deterrence of any unacceptable self-
dealing by those in control of the board. Opponents argued that minority 
14, however, have been challenged. See, e.g., Dent, Proxy Regulation in Search of a Purpose: 
A Reply to Professor Ryan, 23 GA. L. REV. 815 (1988). 
52. A. GRIMES, AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT 441 (1955). 
53. 6 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 491-92 (1933). 
54. Campbell, The Origin and Growth of Cumulative Voting for Directors, 10 Bus. LAW. 
No. 3, 3, 4 (1955). 
55. /d. at 4-5. 
56. /d. at 6. 
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representation interfered with effective, collegial decisionmaking and squan-
dered the valuable time and energy of directors on peripheral issues. 
While cumulative voting was crafted for close corporations, it also applied 
to more widely held enterprises-suggesting that a significant minority of 
shareholders in such companies could enjoy proportional representation on 
their boards. Consequently, because cumulative voting provided the only 
opportunity for non-management shareholders to influence the election of 
directors who presumably would represent their interests, 57 it became the 
most popular subject of shareholder proposals after the 1942 adoption of the 
predecessor to rule 14a-8. 58 
Early shareholder advocates regarded cumulative voting as the most im-
portant plank in their reform platform. 59 These advocates understood, how-
ever, that cumulative voting, without some funding mechanism, amounted 
to an illusory grant of shareholder power. Even shareholder advocate Lewis 
Gilbert, cumulative voting's strongest partisan, conceded that "[i]t is usually 
next to impossible for [a shareholder of a publicly held company] to nomi-
nate and elect his own independent representatives to the board of directors. 
It will take cumulative voting and a better mechanism for allowing share-
holders to make independent nominations to remedy this. "60 
The popularity of cumulative voting has declined in recent years. Hun-
dreds of companies, in connection with the enactment of anti-takeover de-
vices, have eliminated cumulative voting and replaced it with straight voting 
and staggered boards.61 Even California, the last holdout of mandatory cu-
mulative voting, recently made cumulative voting optional for its domicili-
ary corporations. 62 Even where cumulative voting remains, under the 
current system, where the nominators bear all costs of solicitation, its use is 
cost prohibitive unless a substantial transfer of control is sought. 63 In the 
57. Cumulative voting does not ensure that minority shareholders will be independently 
represented on the board. However, it does afford shareholders the opportunity to build alli-
ances and work together to elect their own representatives. E.g., Maddock v. Vorclone Corp., 
17 Del. Ch. 39, 147 A. 255 (1929). 
58. SEC Exchange Act Release No. 3347 (Dec. 18, 1942) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact 
file). 
59. L. GILBERT, DIVIDENDS AND DEMOCRACY 106, 182 (1956). 
60. Id. at 11 (emphasis added). 
61. Corporate Proxy Voting System: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunica-
tions and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, lOist Cong., 1st Sess. 22-27 
(1989) (testimony of James E. Heard, Managing Director, Analysis Group, Inc.) (hereinafter 
Proxy Hearings]. 
62. CAL CORP. CODE§ 708 (West 1988). 
63. Occasionally, a shareholder willing to assume the costs of an independent solicitation 
may take advantage of cumulative voting. For example, at the June 1989 annual meeting of 
Pacific Enterprises, the parent company of Pacific Gas & Electric Co., shareholder Sam Wein-
stein, who is also the regional director of the Utility Workers Union Region 5, received ap-
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absence of a mechanism for including shareholder-initiated nominations on 
the corporate proxy statement and the official proxy ballot, cumulative vot-
ing provides neither a significant restraint on managerial domination over 
board composition nor a genuine vehicle for the expression of shareholder 
discontent. 
B. The Independent Nominating Committee 
In 1982, the American Law Institute (ALI) published Tentative Draft No. 
I of the Principles of Corporate Governance and Structure: Restatement and 
Recommendations. 64 The Draft proposed that the boards of all large pub-
licly held corporations65 consist primarily of independent directors. It fur-
ther advocated the selection of all nominees for board positions by a 
nominating committee composed exclusively of directors "who are not of-
ficers or employees of the corporation, including at least a majority of direc-
tors who have no significant relationships with the corporation's senior 
executives."66 The purpose of this proposal was to "provid[e] an independ-
ent locus of responsibility for the selection and nomination of directors and 
the composition of the board. "67 The Draft noted that "there is often a 
natural tendency for a director who is brought onto the board directly by the 
chief executive officer to feel special obligations to the chief executive. "68 
The "independent locus of responsibility," however, was not premised on 
any special duty to shareholders or on the likelihood that shareholders could 
better communicate with a nominating committee than they could with 
CEO's. The ALI drafters apparently valued "independence" for its own 
sake, and not as a mechanism to increase shareholder influence on directoral 
selection. 
proximately 75% of the votes needed to place him on the company's board. His success was 
attributed largely to the use of the Employees' Stock Ownership Plan and the availability of 
cumulative voting. Not surprisingly, Pacific Enterprises eliminated cumulative voting before 
the 1990 board elections. Revised Procedure Helps Company Resist Union Official's Drive for 
Board Seat, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 44, at A-4 (Mar. 6, 1990). 
64. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STRUCTURE: RESTATEMENT AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS (Tent. Draft No. I, 1982) (hereinafter Tent. Draft No. 1]. The project 
has since been renamed PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS. 
65. A "large publicly-held corporation" is defined as a corporation that, as of the record 
date for its most recent shareholders' meeting, had both 2,000 or more record holders of its 
equity securities and $100 million in total assets. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: 
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 1.16 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1984). 
66. Tent. Draft No. I, supra note 64, § 3.06(a)(1) (citations omitted). 
67. ld. comment c, at 101-02. 
68. /d. 
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This proposal proved uncontroversial because many public companies had 
already adopted some form of nominating committee, 69 and both the Ameri-
can Bar Association70 and the Business Roundtable71 advocated the use of 
non-management controlled nominating committees in public companies. 
Moreover, the ALI Reporter noted that this proposal would in no way ex-
clude in-house managers from the nominating process. The CEO, in partic-
ular, would remain involved: 
[T]he chief executive officer can be expected to be highly active in 
recommending and discussing candidates with the committee and 
is recruiting candidates for the board. Indeed, the chief executive 
officer's active participation in recruitment is often an important 
and perhaps essential element in convincing high-quality individu-
als to become directors. 72 
Thus, although the Business Roundtable decried the Tentative Draft and its 
generally inflexible prescriptive nature, 73 it tacitly supported the nominating 
committee idea. 
In practice, the nominating committee has failed as a means of both dis-
tancing the directoral selection process from the CEO and facilitating share-
holder involvement in corporate governance. So-called "independent 
directors" are seldom that at all. 74 According to one observer with substan-
tial access to corporate boards, "nominating committees are a sham."75 
With few exceptions, the CEO still dominates the nominating committee, 
which accedes to the CEO's wishes.76 Nominating committees rarely seri-
69. /d. comment a, at 98. 
70. Corporate Director's Guidebook. 32 Bus. LAw. 5, 35-36 (1976). 
71. Statement of the Business Roundtable: The Role and Composition of the Board of 
Directors of the Large Publicly Owned Corporation, 33 Bus. LAW. 2083, 2110 (1978). 
72. Tent. Draft No. I, supra note 64, § 3.06(aXI) comment c, at 102-03. Shareholders 
could also be involved. The ABA proposal took notice of the possibility of shareholder input 
to nominating committee deliberations. "This procedure will, it is believed, be a more effective 
and workable method of affording access to the nominating process to individual shareholders 
than a direct 'right' of nominating in the corporation's proxy materials." Corporate Director's 
Guidebook, supra note 70, at 35. 
73. STATEMENT OF THE BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE ON THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE'S 
PROPOSED "PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STRUCTURE: RESTATEMENT 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS" 33 (Feb. 1983). 
74. See generally Brudney, The Independent Director-Heavenly City or Potemkin Vil-
lage?, 95 HARV. L. REv. 597, 611-13 (1982) (noting the disinclination on the part of "in-
dependent directors" to keep management at arm's length due to several psychological and 
social considerations); Cox &. Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom: Psychological Foundations 
and Legal Implications of Corporate Cohesion, 48 LAW&. CONTEMP. PROBS. 43 (1985). 
75. Proxy Hearings, supra note 61, at 12-16 (testimony of Dale M. Hanson, CEO, Califor-
nia Public Employees Retirement System). 
76. Id. at S9. 
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ously solicit shareholder input or advance shareholder nominated 
candidates. 77 
In a recent review of the proxy statements distributed to shareholders of 
125 large public companies during the 1988 proxy season, 78 thirty-seven (or 
30%) had no standing nominating committee. 79 Of those companies with 
nominating committees, five were chaired by the company's CEO. 80 Many 
other companies listed the CEO as a member, although not the chair, of 
their nominating committees. Six companies referred their nominating deci-
sions to an Executive Committee.81 
Whether or not these companies had nominating committees, only sixty-
nine (or 55%) of the companies gave any indication in their proxy state-
ments that they would accept directoral nominations from shareholders. 82 
77. In 1989, the author surveyed 85 men and women who served on the nominating com-
mittees of S&P 500 corporations during fiscal year 1988; thirteen of these committee members 
responded. The survey requested their estimate of the percent of directoral candidates whose 
names appeared on the official corporate ballot during their tenure who were recommended 
initially by the CEO, by other members of the board of directors, or by any shareholder other 
than the CEO or members of the board, including institutional investors. The responses uni-
formly identified the CEO as the primary source of directoral nominees-the minimum re-
ported in any company was 50% of all nominees. The respondents more typically stated that 
90-100% of all nominees were initially recommended by the CEO. Shareholders accounted for 
5% or less of all nominees. One respondent dismissed the input of shareholders as being no 
more than "one person recommending [himself]-with little or no qualifications." None of the 
respondents routinely sought the input of key institutional investors, even though these inves-
tors are usually well known to committee members. 
78. The documents underlying this study [hereinafter Proxy Statement Review] are on file 
with the author. 
79. /d.; e.g., ALBERTO-CULVER Co., PROXY 3 (Dec. 10, 1987); AMERICAN HOME PROD-
UCTS CORP., PROXY 6 (Mar. 15, 1988); APPLE COMPUTER, INC., PROXY 3 (Dec. 7, 1987); E.l. 
DUPONT DE NEMOURS AND Co., PROXY 3 (Mar. 29, 1988); MARRIOTT CORP., PROXY 6 
(Mar. 29, 1988); THE NEW YORK TIMES Co., PROXY 7-14 (Mar. 8, 1988); THE WALT DIS-
NEY Co., PROXY 8 (Jan. 8, 1988). 
80. See Proxy Statement Review, supra note 78; e.g .• CAMPBELL Soup Co., PROXY 7, 10 
(Oct. 16, 1987); EXXON CORP., PROXY II (Mar. 28, 1988); THE GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER 
Co., PROXY 6, 15 (Feb. 22, 1988); H.J. HEINZ Co., PROXY 5 (Aug. 3, 1987). 
81. See Proxy Statement Review, supra note 78; e.g .. BAKER HUGHES, INC., PROXY 9 
(Dec. 16, 1987); BAUSCH & LOMB, INC., PROXY 2 (Mar. 18, 1988); DAYTON HUDSON CORP., 
PROXY 6 (Apr. 22, 1988); MATTEL, INC., PROXY 4 (Mar. 27, 1988). 
82. See Proxy Statement Review, supra note 78. The SEC requires this information for 
public companies with standing nominating committees. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-IOI Item 7(e)(2) 
(1990). One reason offered to explain why so many companies fail to create nominating com-
mittees is that they wish to avoid having to disclose shareholder recommendation procedures. 
Olson, "Proxy Statement Disclosures as to the Operations of the Board of Directors: Board 
Committees, Board Meetings, Resignations and Removals of and Disagreements with Direc-
tors," in Proxy Statements and Annual Meetings Under the New SEC Rules, LAW & Bus. II, 
18 (1979), quoted in SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 96TH 
CONG., 2D SESS., SEC STAFF REPORT ON CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY 117 (Comm. Print 
1980) (hereinafter SEC STAFF REPORT ON CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY). 
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Of these companies, many conceded that they had not established proce-
dures for reviewing shareholder nominations, 83 while others described elabo-
rate and deterrent procedures, either embodied in corporate bylaws or 
management tradition. 84 These procedures included a common requirement 
that the shareholder proponent provide the company with biographical and 
all other information necessary to comply with the disclosure requirements 
of the federal proxy regulations before the nominee would be considered. 85 
Fifteen companies even required the shareholder proponent to supply an ex-
ecuted consent form from the nominee before the company would consider 
the nominee. 86 Surely these procedures were not designed to maximize 
shareholder input to the directoral selection process or to generate top-qual-
ity nominees. 
An individual typically seeks a corporate directorship only after careful 
consideration and, under existing nominating practices, some assurance of 
acceptance by the committee in control. A board member of a large indus-
trial company generally receives a retainer in the range of $10,000 to 
$50,000, plus deferred compensation, and meeting fees ranging upwards to 
$2500 per meeting. 87 A directorship position requires a commitment of 
twenty-four to thirty-six full days per year88 and a willingness to enter into 
confidential and sometimes quite intimate relationships with other directors, 
especially during a business crisis. In addition, a directorship carries the 
potential for both legal liability and public exposure. Absent an acceptable 
alternative means of nomination, such as the one suggested in this Article, it 
is difficult to imagine an able directoral candidate giving a signed consent to 
83. See Proxy Statement Review, supra note 78; e.g., GENERAL INSTRUMENT CORP., 
PROXY 3 (May 20, 1988); SQUARE 0 Co., PROXY 6 (Mar. 15, 1988); W.W. GRAINGER, INC., 
PROXY 12 (Mar. 30, 1988). 
84. See Proxy Statement Review, supra note 78; e.g., ABBOTI LABORATORIES, PROXY 5 
(Mar. 7, 1988); BAUSCH & LOMB, INC., PROXY 2 (Mar. 18, 1988); CBI INDUSTRIES, INC., 
PROXY 4 (Mar. 25, 1988); REYNOLDS METALS Co., PROXY 14 (Mar. 7, 1988). 
85. See Proxy Statement Review, supra note 78. Required information includes share 
ownership, business experience and positions held during the last five years, other director-
ships, involvement in legal proceedings, personal or family business or other similar relation-
ships with the corporation, any of its subsidiaries, or with the corporation's officers and 
directors, and personal or familial indebtedness to the corporation. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 
Item 7(1990). 
86. See Proxy Statement Review, supra note 78; e.g., BALLY MANUFACTURING CORP., 
PROXY 4 (Mar. 23, 1988); GEORGIA-PACIFIC CORP., PROXY 5 (Mar. 22, 1988); KRAFT, INC., 
PROXY 5 (Mar. 23, 1988); MCGRAW-HILL, INC., PROXY 6 (Mar. 24, 1988); THE QUAKER 
OATS Co., PROXY II (Sept. II, 1987); TIME INC., PROXY 9-10 (Mar. 14, 1988). 
87. HEWITT ASSOCIATES, COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR OUTSIDE DIRECTORS IN 
THE FORTUNE 100 INDUSTRIALs-1988. 
88. Sherman, Pushing Corporate Boards to Be Better, FORTUNE, July 18, 1988, at 58, 62-
63. 
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a shareholder to make, in essence, a "cold call" on the nominating commit-
tee with a petition promoting her nomination in hand. 89 
In recent years, many institutional investors, rather than consenting to the 
proprietary practices of board nominating committees, have attempted to 
participate in the directoral nominating process. In 1988, the California 
Public Employees Retirement System (CalPERS), the nation's largest public 
pension fund, submitted a shareholder proposal under rule 14a-8 to Texaco, 
Inc., to provide for the establishment of a Stockholders' Advisory Commit-
tee made up of nine of the company's largest shareholders or their represent-
atives. CalPERS envisioned this Committee providing input into the 
directoral nomination process. Although CalPERS later withdrew this pro-
posal when Texaco's management agreed to nominate a directoral candidate 
from a list submitted by CalPERS,90 the fund submitted similar proposals 
for the creation of shareholders' advisory committees for inclusion in the 
1990 proxies of TRW, Avon, and Occidental Petroleum.91 
CalPERS generally prefers a less formal approach, and has undertaken a 
"multi-year program in which it will seek to achieve the level of cooperation 
and support necessary to increase shareholder input into the nomination 
process."92 Specifically, 
CalPERS has identified at least one company from its portfolio 
that has: (1) consistently performed poorly over the last several 
years, in comparison to its market; and (2) exhibited insensitivity 
toward its shareholders through the adoption, without shareholder 
approval, of numerous anti-takeover provisions. During the next 
12 months, executives from CalPERS will attempt to meet with the 
management of this company to discuss the fund's concern with 
the company's performance. Although CalPERS' goal is to attain 
management support through communication and mutual respect, 
if the managers fail to consider the fund's interests, the second 12-
89. It is fair to ask why capable candidates would be willing to subject themselves to a 
competitive selection process when officially nominated, rather than just unofficially recom-
mended, by a shareholder. The answer to this question will ultimately depend on a number of 
considerations. These include: the stature and credibility of the nominators, a developing 
consensus that candidates nominated under an access rule are equal to those candidates nomi-
nated by management, and the existence of ambitious and able candidates who are not part of 
the traditional pool from which corporate directors have been drawn. 
90. See Clark, Why Dale Hanson Won't Go Away, INST'L INVESTOR Apr. 1990, at 84. 
91. CaiPERS withdrew the proposals at TRW and Occidental when those companies 
agreed to meet with CaiPERS to discuss improved shareholder participation. The proposal 
appeared on Avon's ballot at its May 3, 1990, annual shareholders' meeting and was narrowly 
defeated. Letter from Kayla Gillan, CaiPERS Assistant General Counsel, to the author (Apr. 
5, 1990) (on file at the Catholic University Law Review). 
92. Koppes & Gillan, The Role of Pension Fund Investors in the Election of Corporate 
Directors, 2 INSIGHTS No. 12, at II, 13 (Dec. 1988). 
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month period will involve establishing a broad level of support 
from fellow shareholders. Shareholder proposals, soliciting votes 
against incumbent management, and, as a last resort, a proxy con-
test may be considered. 93 
53 
At one point, CalPERS supported shareholder access to the proxy.94 Al-
ternatively, it suggested a formal role on the nominating committee forma-
jor institutional investors.95 The recent CalPERS petition to the SEC, 
urging overhaul of existing proxy voting regulations,96 abandons both posi-
tions, perhaps because of CalPERS' success in demanding a governance role 
even in the absence of an access rule. 97 Other institutional investors, how-
ever, are increasingly expressing an interest in playing a meaningful and 
ongoing role in directoral selection. 98 In a 1989 survey of institutional inves-
tors, the Investor Responsibility Research Center found that 43% of the 
respondents favored access to the ballot proposals, 26% disfavored them, 
and 31% indicated that they would consider such proposals on a case by 
case basis. 99 These responses reflect a substantial increase in support for 
access proposals when compared to a similar survey conducted the previous 
year. 100 The Council of Institutional Investors, representing $300 billion in 
assets, has also expressed interest in the access issue. 101 
93. /d. 
94. Proxy Hearings, supra note 61, at 70 (written answers of Dale M. Hanson to subcom-
mittee questions); Letter from Richard H. Koppes, CalPERS General Counsel, to the author 
(Aug. 22, 1989) (on file at the Catholic University Law Review). 
95. Sullivan, Two of Texaco's Institutional Holders To Seek a Role in Nominating Direc-
tors, Wall St. J., Aug. 17, 1988, at 5, col. 1. 
96. See Letter from Richard H. Koppes, CalPERS General Counsel, to Linda C. Quinn, 
Director, Division of Corporation Finance, Securities and Exchange Commission (Nov. 3, 
1989) (on file at the Catholic University Law Review). 
97. See Clark, supra note 90, at 29. CalPERS' CEO regularly meets with Texaco's man-
agement, has met with the CEO of General Motors, and is working with TRW's management 
on corporate governance concerns. /d. at 84. "We'd just as soon avoid the proxy vote," 
CaiPERS' chief executive has said. "We don't like to be adversarial." ld. 
98. A motivating factor, according to one fund manager, is the refusal of existing boards 
to take the institutional investors seriously. " 'They respond surprisingly poorly to our con-
cerns' .... 'We have a limitation of 10% ownership of a company. Management won't listen 
to us when we own 3%.' " Hollie, Activism Not Role for Firms. PENSIONS & INVESTMENT 
AGE, Oct. 2, 1989, at 24 (quoting John Brennan, president of The Vanguard Group, which 
manages $45 billion in assets). 
99. l. KRASNOW, VOTING BY INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS ON CORPORATE GOVERN-
ANCE ISSUES IN THE 1989 PROXY SEASON 22 ( 1989). Of those responding to the survey, 64% 
of the public funds, 38% of the investment managers, and 18% of the universities, founda-
tions, and church groups favored equal access to the proxy. ld. at 23. 
100. /d. 
101. O'Hara, Council, Roundtable to Discuss Director Nomi11ations, 6 IRRC CoRP. Gov-
ERNANCE BULL. 58-59 (Mar./ Apr. 1989). 
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Ill. DIRECT ACCESS TO THE PROXY PROPOSALS 
Neither cumulative voting nor the widespread use of independent nomi-
nating committees succeeded in providing an effective role for shareholders 
in the selection of directoral candidates or in the formulation of board poli-
cies. Many proposals have attempted to create such a role and to resolve the 
access to the ballot problem in diverse ways. Some proposals involved radi-
cally overhauling the corporate governance structure, with shareholder ac-
cess to the proxy merely an element of the larger scheme. Most proposals 
advocated a straightforward attempt to achieve greater shareholder repre-
sentation within the existing governance structure. 
A. The Early Access Proposals 
In 1942, the SEC proposed an amendment to the then-existing proxy rules 
that required inclusion of shareholder-designated directoral nominees in the 
annual corporate proxy statement. 102 Poorly crafted and widely criticized 
by corporate managements consumed with problems of wartime production, 
the proposal was soon abandoned. 103 
The first resurrection of the access issue after the war appeared in an arti-
cle by Mortimer M. Caplin, later appointed Commissioner of Internal Reve-
102. The proposed Rule provided, inter alia: 
No authority shall be sought to vote a proxy upon the election of any person to 
anyoffice for which a bona fide nominee is not named in the proxy statement. The 
name of each nominee of the persons making the solicitation shall be set forth in the 
form of proxy in such a manner that the person solicited can strike out the name of a 
nominee for whom he does not wish to vote. In the event a security holder has 
notified the management pursuant to Item S(M) of Schedule 14A of an intention to 
nominate and support a nominee or nominees the name of each such nominee shall 
also be set forth in the form of proxy together with a form of ballot in which the 
person solicited can indicate that he wishes his securities voted for such nominee and 
a statement to the effect that the proxy may be voted for the election of the nominees 
proposed by the management unless the person solicited indicates he wishes his se-
curities voted for another nominee or other nominees and specifies the nominee or 
nominees proposed by the management for whom he does not wish his securities 
voted. In the event that security holders notify the management of an intention to 
nominate and support more than twice as many nominees as there are directors of 
the issuer, the management may select, on any equitable basis, name and furnish the 
required information concerning only twice as many nominees as there are directors. 
Note, A Proposal for the Designation of Shareholder Nominees for Director in the Corporate 
Proxy Statement, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 1139, 1154 n.79 (1974). 
103. SEC Exchange Act Release No. 3347 (Dec. 18, 1942) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact 
file). "The principal reasons given for this decision were that unqualified persons might be 
nominated, that too many candidates might be nominated, and that the shareholders would 
become confused and improperly mark their proxies." Hetherington, When the Sleeper 
Wakes: Reflections on Corporate Governance and Shareholder Rights. 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
183, 214 (1979). 
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nue. 104 The article complain~ that the post-Exchange Act proxy voting 
machinery, like that which preceded the Act, was completely dominated by 
corporate managers. Noting that shareholders lacked any practical low-cost 
means for making directoral nominations, Caplin advocated that sharehold-
ers of public companies should have a "real channel for the free nominations 
of all directors. " 10s Caplin then proposed a formula for determining the 
maximum number of directoral candidates, including those nominated by 
management, which could be submitted to shareholders on the company's 
proxy. 106 Alternatively, he suggested a rule that would permit individual 
companies to determine the manner in which directoral nominations could 
be submitted. 107 Finally, Caplin argued that one position on the board of 
directors should be set aside exclusively for direct shareholder 
nomination. 108 
Criticism of Caplin's proposal focused primarily on his jurisdictional 
claims that section 14 essentially empowered the SEC unilaterally to adopt 
his proposal as a matter of federal law. According to Caplin, the Commis-
sion at the time was "not that aggressive," and regarded his ideas as "a little 
far out. " 109 The access to the proxy issue then lapsed for nearly twenty 
years. 
B. The Access-on-Demand Theory 
In the 1970's, Professor Melvin Eisenberg brought greater depth to the 
access discussion in his article Access to the Corporate Proxy Machinery, 110 
104. Caplin, Shareholder Nominations of Directors: A Program for Fair Corporate Suffrage, 
39 VA. L. REV. 141 (1953). 
105. /d. at 152. 
106. /d. at 152-SJ. 
107. ld. at 153. This portion of Caplin's proposal was similar to that advanced by the 
Gilbert brothers, Lewis and John, who had long urged that: 
[I]ndependent nominations, of either a single candidate for the board of directors or 
an entire insurgent slate, must be carried in the management proxy statement just as 
shareholder proposals now are carried. In the first place, the proxy statement is not 
properly the management's despite the usual designation, but it is the corporation's 
with all shareholders sharing its costs. Thus a proper place for the presentation of a 
proxy challenge to management is the proxy statement which legally and ethically 
belongs to the shareholders . . . . 
This refonn ... is a crucial one for the movement of independent public sharehold-
ers. It should receive, along with the ever-growing demand for cumulative voting, 
constant and unremitting attention. 
L. GILBERT, supra note 59, at 166-67. 
108. Caplin, supra note 104, at 152. 
109. Telephone interview with Mortimer Caplin, now of Caplin & Drysdale, Washington, 
D.C. (May 24, 1990). 
110. 83 HARV. L. REV. 1489 (1970). 
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and his book THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION. 111 Both works chal-
lenged the notion that shareholders lack a means of access to the corporate 
proxy statement. Noting the shareholders' exclusive right to elect corporate 
directors, Eisenberg argued that shareholders enjoy a corollary right to nom-
inate candidates for board positions which, because "the proxy system is 
today's shareholders' meeting," 112 includes access to the proxy materials for 
the purpose of making the nomination known to other shareholders. 113 Ei-
senberg urged shareholders to demand the right to include their board candi-
dates in the proxy statement, even in the absence of the sort of SEC or 
legislative action proposed by Caplin. Eisenberg noted that the marginal 
cost of adding shareholder nominated directoral candidates to the corporate 
proxy statement would be minimal, and that the cost could be further re-
duced by adopting exclusionary by-laws which would impose a standing re-
quirement in the form of a minimum ownership percentage. 114 
Eisenberg emphasized a principle of neutrality in matters of ballot access. 
Examining the case law that permitted management to utilize the corporate 
proxy machinery to solicit shareholder support on "issues of policy," but not 
"issues of personnel," Eisenberg found the distinction "incapable of mean-
ingful application." 115 As a consequence, Eisenberg discovered, manage-
ment routinely used the corporate proxy solicitation to seek support for its 
directoral candidates in contests for control, without incurring personal fi-
nancial obligations. Eisenberg argued that fairness and fiduciary principles 
required granting nonmanagement shareholders the same privilege. 
Little came of Eisenberg's proposal in the short run. Although he encoun-
tered no immediate feedback, 116 his ideas surfaced repeatedly as part of the 
growing literature on corporate accountability during the 1970's. 
C. The "Social Responsibility" Proposals of the 1970's 
A number of commentators explored ballot access issues throughout the 
1970's. Following a seminar on the Corporation in Modern Society, student 
Robert Shwartz published a widely cited Note 117 urging the creation of a 
mechanism that would allow shareholders to select directoral nominees who 
would be designated as such on the corporate proxy statement. 118 He ex-
II I. M. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION (1976). 
112. Eisenberg, supra note 110, at 1505. 
113. /d. 
114. /d. at 1510. 
115. M. EISENBERG, supra note Ill, at 105. 
116. Telephone interview with Melvin Eisenberg, Professor of Law, University of Califor-
nia, Berkeley (May 24, 1990). 
117. Note, supra note 102. 
118. /d. at 1146-48. 
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plored and rejected three possible means of achieving this result: share-
holder proposals on a corporation-by-corporation basis, revision of state law 
on a state-by-state basis, and revision of the listing requirements of the New 
York Stock Exchange. 119 
Concluding that the SEC's proxy regulation powers would be the most 
effective vehicle for generating shareholder access, Shwartz considered the 
specifics of such a plan, focusing first on the "standing" question. 120 Asking 
how many shares a shareholder should own or control to be entitled access 
to the proxy, he argued that "(t]he standard should be sufficiently high to 
ensure that shareholder sponsors will represent a 'significant interest' of the 
corporate electorate" 121 and to guard against or minimize the harassment of 
management. 122 Nevertheless, he advocated a "minimal" ownership re-
quirement for entitling shareholders to nominate directoral candidates, pre-
ferring to rely on a numerical limitation, or "cap," on the total number of 
candidates listed in any proxy statement123 as the primary medium for con-
trolling runaway proxies filled with nominations. 124 
Shwartz also examined some logistical questions related to the access is-
sue, including the determination of an appropriate formula for selecting 
nominees in the event "too many" candidates' names were submitted, and 
the options for dealing with unsigned ballots. In a key lapse of real-world 
understanding, however, he failed to appreciate that putting together a nom-
inating group might constitute "solicitation" under rule 14a-1. m 
119. /d. at 1148-54. 
120. /d. at 1157-59. 
121. /d. at 1157. The notion of requiring some significant showing of electoral support 
before. having one's name appear on the ballot is common in public suffrage. See. e.g .• Ander-
son v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788-89 n.9 (1983) (states have an "undoubted right to require 
candidates to make a preliminary showing of substantial support in order to qualify for a place 
on the ballot."); American Party of Tex. v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 782 (1974) (state may require 
minor political parties to demonstrate a "significant, measurable quantum of community sup-
port" through petition signatures, as a condition of ballot access); Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 
431, 438 ( 1971) (state may require independent candidates to submit signatures equal to 5% of 
those eligible to vote for the office sought at the last election). 
122. Note, supra note 102, at 1157. 
123. /d. at 1159. 
124. States can effectively cap the number of candidates whose names may appear on a 
general election ballot. E.g .. Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 199 (1986) (state 
may exclude from the general election ballot any minor party's candidates, when such candi-
dates in the primary election did not receive at least I% of all votes cast for the office sought). 
See generally Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 712 (1974) (citing historical efforts at limiting the 
length of the ballot). 
12S. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-l (1990); see infra notes 338-46 and accompanying text. 
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Other commentaries followed, addressing similar issues. 126 For example, 
who would be subject to liability for misstatements in descriptive materials 
contained in the proxy statement in support of the shareholder nominated 
directoral candidates?127 What limits would be placed on electioneering to 
avoid the application of rule 14a-11, the proxy contest rule?128 
Finally, a new voice joined these recurring and largely technical discus-
sions of shareholder access to the proxy. In TAMING THE GIANT CORPORA-
TION, 129 consumer advocate Ralph Nader and his colleagues advocated 
federal chartering of large publicly held corporations, establishing an exclu-
sively "outside" board of directors, and the "institutionalization of a new 
profession: the full-time 'professional' director." 130 Under this model, these 
directors would be well paid and well staffed to induce them to work full 
time, even at the cost of possible disharmony with the operating execu-
tives.131 Moreover, the Nader group proposed assigning each director a par-
ticular constituency, such as employees, consumers, neighboring citizens, 
shareholders, or other.groups. 132 Each director would be responsible for the 
concerns of his or her constituents when attending to corporate governance 
matters. Underlying these proposals was a selection and nomination process 
that wholly excluded incumbent management: 
[A]ny shareholder or allied shareholder group which owns .1 per-
cent of the common voting stock in the corporation or comprises 
100 or more individuals and does not include a present executive of 
the corporation, nor act for a present executive, may nominate up 
to three persons to serve as directors. This will ... increase[ ] the 
likelihood of a diverse board by preventing any one or two sources 
from proposing all nominees . 
. . . All campaign costs would be borne by the corporation. [Cu-
mulative voting would be required.) 133 
All of these proposals shared the ultimate goal of broadening the corpora-
tion's mission to encompass protection of every aspect of society. A decade 
later, however, new voices joined in the quest for access to the proxy. Their 
126. E.g., Black, Shareholder Democracy and Corporate Governance, S SEC. REG. L.J. 291 
(1978); Feis, Is Shareholder Democracy Atiainab/e?, 31 Bus. LAW. 621 (1976); Weiss, Disclo-
sure and Corporate Accountability, 34 Bus. LAW. 575, 593 n.65 (1979). 
127. Feis, supra note 126, at 633. 
128. /d.; see infra notes 349-54 and accompanying text. 
129. R. NADER, M. GREEN & ]. SELIGMAN, TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION (1976). 
130. /d. at 121. 
131. "Under normal circumstances there should be a healthy friction between operating 
executives and the board to assJre that the wisest possible use is made of corporate resources." 
/d. at 122. 
132. /d. at 125. 
133. /d. at 127-28. 
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ultimate purpose was quite different-the protection of incumbent manage-
ment from hostile takeovers. 
D. The ''Anti-Takeover" Proposals of the 1980's 
In 1987, Martin Lipton, critic of corporate takeovers and "inventor" of 
the poison pill, strongly urged comprehensive reform of the tax and federal 
securities laws to curb hostile takeover activity, accompanied by a "renewal 
of shareholder democracy." 134 He proposed that: 
[T]he federal securities laws [should] be amended to allow any 
shareholder, or group of shareholders, with more than $5 million 
in market value of the corporation's shares free and equal access to 
the corporation's proxy machinery at the corporation's expense. 
Shareholders with less than a $5 million stake would remain free to 
pursue independent proxy solicitations. 135 
Lipton advanced this proposal to provide "a means of making manage-
ment responsive to the needs of shareholders and other corporate constituen-
cies."136 He argued that "shareholder democracy" was far preferable to the 
"hostile tender offer as a device for disciplining management." 137 Further, 
he advocated a central role for institutional shareholders in corporate re-
form, noting the expertise they might bring to corporate decisionmaking 
once freed from their fixation on short-term gain: 
Institutional shareholders will be able to guide corporate manage-
ment in the long-term interest of the corporation and all its constit-
uencies. To the corporation's benefit, its shareholder constituency 
will remain relatively stable. The diversity of its institutional own-
ers, moreover, will ensure that a variety of views is expressed over 
time, with the attendant benefits of pluralist corporate 
democracy. 138 
Professor Louis Lowenstein continued to examine the role of shareholder 
voting in reducing abuses in the takeover market in his book, WHAT's 
WRONG WITH WALL STREET: SHORT-TERM GAIN AND THE ABSENTEE 
SHAREHOLDER, 139 published shortly after the 1987 market break. Lowen-
stein asked how shareholders, especially institutional investors, could be en-
couraged to perform better as corporate monitors given their herdlike 
134. Lipton, Corporate Governance in the Age of Finance Corporatism. 136 U. PA. L. REV. 
1, 66 (1987). 
135. /d. at 67-68 (footnotes omitted). 
136. /d. at 6. 
137. /d. at 68-69. 
138. /d. at 69. 
139. L. LoWENSTEIN, WHAT'S WRONG WITH WALL STREET: SHORT-TERM GAIN AND 
THE ABSENTEE SHAREHOLDER (1988). 
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behavior and nomadic turnover in holdings. 140 As one response, he pro-
posed granting shareholders the exclusive right to nominate and elect, "sepa-
rately from the nomination {and election] of directors generally, a significant 
but still minority number of additional directors, e.g., 20-25% of the 
board." 141 Lowenstein designed this proposal to encourage the nomination 
and election of candidates put forward by, and accountable to, institutional 
investors. 142 This proposal would create a new class of "very independent" 
directors, 143 who nevertheless would be subject to all the fiduciary obliga-
tions of other board members. 
Professor Lowenstein envisioned a procedure which would allow any 
shareholder to propose one or more candidates for the reserved positions. 
The shareholders as a group would then receive a final list of candidates 
consisting of approximately twice the number of candidates as available 
directoral positions, with the selection comprised of the candidates receiving 
the largest number of nominations. 144 Lowenstein argued that his plan 
would permit "open[ing] up the nomination process, without fear that it will 
somehow be trivialized by corporate gadflies and others whose interests may 
be primarily personal, social, or political." 145 
A subsequent Wall Street Journal commentary, relying largely on Euro-
pean models, advocated a more radical version of Lowenstein's dual class 
board. 146 Under this proposal, public companies would have two governing 
bodies: first, a group of "loyal cabinet advisers" 147 selected by management 
and accountable only to management; and second, a distinct group of "su-
pervisory directors" 148 selected by shareholders from candidates nominated 
both by management and individual shareholders. 149 Non-management 
nominees would have to demonstrate some minimum level of support-for 
example, 3% or $500,000 of a corporation's stock-to appear on the corpo-
rate ballot. 1 so Only the supervisory directors could be held accountable to 
140. /d. at 5, 8. 
141. /d. at 209 (emphasis added). 
142. /d. at 210. 
143. /d. 
144. /d. at 209-10. 
145. /d. at 210. 
146. Nadel, More Power to the Stockholders, Wall St. J;, June 26, 1989, at AS, col. 4. 
147. /d. at AS, col. 5. 
14S. /d. 
149. /d. In Germany, a comparable two-tier structure is mandatory. In France, the struc-
ture is optional. Eisenberg, Legal Models of Management Structure in the Modern Corpora-
tion: Officers, Directors, and Accountants, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 375, 409 (1975); Munyon, 
Shareholders' Rights in the Common Market: A Comparative Study, 9 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 
191 , 208 (1976). 
150. Nadel, supra note 146, at AS, col. 5. 
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shareholders. That is, shareholder derivative suits for breach of fiduciary 
duty could only be brought against these directors and not against the 
"cabinet." 151 
E. Congressional Access Proposals 
Occasionally, Congress has considered the access issue, usually in connec-
tion with proposed anti-takeover legislation. The first bills to incorporate 
access to the proxy provisions apl?eared in the early 1980's, when Senator 
Howard Metzenbaum (D-Ohio) introduced the "Protection of Shareholders' 
Rights Act of 1980"152 and Representative Benjamin Rosenthal (D-N.Y.) 
introduced the "Corporate Democracy Act of 1980." 153 While the issue 
died quickly in 1980, an increase in hostile takeovers and resultant defensive 
activities during the mid-1980's154 brought renewed interest in shareholder 
democracy issues. 
Several bills which encompassed access to the proxy provisions were intro-
duced in the 100th Congress. Senator Donald Riegle (D-Mich.) and former 
Senator William Proxmire (D-Wis.), respectively the current and former 
chairman of the Senate Banking Committee, introduced the "Tender Offer 
Disclosure and Fairness Act of 1987."155 As amended, the bill provided 
shareholders owning 10% or more of a company's stock with access to the 
proxy for purposes of either responding to management's directoral nomina-
tions or proposing their own. 156 After extended floor debate in the summer 
lSI. /d. at AS, col. 6. 
152. S. 2567, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. § S(a) (l9SO). This bill provided: 
Shareholders of an affected corporation, in advance of the meeting at which direc-
tors are to be elected, shall have the right to nominate candidates for the board of 
directors of such affected corporation if each such candidate nominated for a direc-
torship by a shareholder is supported by the holder or holders of one-half of 1 per 
centum of shares outstanding at the time the name of such candidate is sought to be 
placed in nomination. 
/d., quoted in SEC STAFF REPORT ON CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note S2, at A57. 
153. H.R. 7010, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. § lOS(a) (19SO). This bill provided that 
"[s]hareholders of voting stock of any corporation subject to this Act shall have the right to 
nominate candidates for the board of directors of such corporation." /d., quoted in SEC STAFF 
REPORT ON CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note S2, at ASS. The bill authorized the 
SEC to establish threshold requirements for access to the ballot for shareholder nominated 
directoral candidates. /d. 
154. Completed mergers increased in value from $33 billion in 19SO to $226 billion in 19SS. 
23 MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS ALMANAC No. 6, at 53 (l9S9). 
ISS. S. 1323, lOOth Cong., lst Sess. (19S7). 
156. /d. § II as amended, reprinted in 19 INST. ON SEC. REG. 3S3 (19S7). 
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of 1988, the bill stalled over a controversial amendment prohibiting poison 
pills, and the Democratic leadership permitted it to die. 1s7 
During the same term, Representatives John Dingell (D-Mich.) and Ed-
ward Markey (D-Mass.), respectively the current Chairman of the House 
Energy and Commerce Committee and Chairman of the House Subcommit-
tee on Telecommunications and Finance, introduced the "Tender Offer Re-
form Act of 1987." 1s8 The Dingell-Markey bill entitled any shareholder 
with the greater of either 3% of the voting power or $500,000 worth of 
shares in any public company to access to the corporate proxy machinery to 
nominate directoral candidates. 1s9 This bill, along with its Republican 
counterpart, 160 died without reaching the House floor. Later, Congressman 
Markey indicated his willingness to introduce another access proposal. 161 
In the 101 st session of Congress, Senators Howard Metzenbaum (D-Ohio) 
and William Armstrong (R-Colo.) jointly introduced "The Corporate Take-
over Reform Act of 1989."162 This bill provided that any shareholder or 
shareholder group representing 3% or more of a company's voting shares 
may submit in proxy materials statements or counterproposals on transac-
tional issues and the nomination of directoral candidates. These statements 
and counterproposals would be afforded "equal space, coverage, and treat-
ment" as is conferred on management's statements and proposals. 163 
IV. THE MERCURIAL ROLE OF THE SEC IN PROMOTING, THEN 
THWARTING, SHAREHOLDER ACCESS TO THE PROXY 
The Securities and Exchange Commission has played an interesting role in 
the debate over the importance of shareholder access to the proxy. After the 
Commission initiated the idea in 1942,164 thirty-five years passed before the 
Commission readdressed the issue. Since then, the Commission has moved 
157. Special Report: Buyouts Leading List of Hot Issues as Congress Faces Busy Year in 
Securities, 21 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 3, at 130, 134-35 (Jan. 20, 1989). 
158. H.R. 2172, tOOth Cong., 1st Sess. (1987). 
159. /d. § 6. 
160. H.R. 2668, tOOth Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) (the Lent-Rinaldo bill). 
161. McGurn, Congress Moves to Pension, Shareholder Issues, 6 IRRC CORP. GoVERN-
ANCE BULL. 115 (July/Aug. 1989). Representative Markey's proposal would allow stockhold-
ers who own the greater of either 5% or $500,000 of a company's outstanding shares to 
nominate candidates to the board of directors. /d. 
162. S. 1244, !Olst Cong., 1st Sess. (1989). 
163. /d. § 8. During the same term, Senator Richard Shelby (D-Ata.) introduced the "In-
vestor Equality Act" which provides that any shareholder or shareholder group holding at 
least 10% of the voting power of a company's securities will be given ballot access to both 
respond to management proposals and board nominations and apparently to initiate their own 
proposals and board nominations. S. 1658, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 9 (1989). 
164. See supra text accompanying note 102. 
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slowly from embracing the access idea to abandoning it, both at the policy 
level and at the operational level. 
A. The Commission's Shifting Regulatory Posture 
In the wake of the corporate democracy movement of the mid-1970's and 
in response to proposals such as Ralph Nader's, 16s the Commission resur-
rected its general interest in shareholders' rights and its specific interest in 
access to the proxy. The influence of then-Chairman Harold M. Williams, a 
vigorous advocate of the wholly independent board of directors, 166 and then-
SEC Enforcement Division Director Stanley M. Sporkin 167 greatly contrib-
uted to the Commission's interest. 
On April 28, 1977, the Commission issued a release seeking public com-
ment on several corporate governance issues, including the question of 
shareholder access to the proxy. 168 One of the stated reasons for the inquiry 
was the Commission's recognition "that under the existing regulations 
shareholders often may not be provided adequate opportunities to partici-
pate meaningfully in corporate governance or the corporate electoral pro-
cess."169 After considering preliminary responses, the Commission focused 
on several specific questions relating to shareholder access and then resolic-
ited public comment. 170 More than 300 witnesses testified before the Com-
mission on these and related questions. 
165. See supra text accompanying notes 129-33. 
166. See speeches cited in Branson, Countertrends in Corporation Law: Model Business 
Corporation Act Revision. British Compony Law Reform. and Principles of Corporate Govern-
ance and Structure, 68 MINN. L. REV. 53, 98 n.211 (1983). 
167. In June 1977, in a speech before the Business Week Conference on Corporate Direc-
tors, Sporkin presented his "six-point" program to improve corporate governance. The first of 
his six points was to ensure that "public shareholders have board representation even though it 
might be disproportionate to their holdings." Ferrara & Goldfus, The Government and Corpo-
rate Governance: What It Hears and How It is Responding, in A. COHEN & R. LoEB, CoRPO-
RATE GOVERNANCE 107 (1979). 
168. Re-examination of Proxy Rules, SEC Exchange Act Release No. 13,482, [1977-78 
Transfer Binder] Fed Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 81,130 (April 28, 1977). 
169. /d. 
170. The specific questions posed were: 
(I) Should shareholders have access to management's proxy soliciting materials for 
the purpose of nominating persons of their choice to serve on the board of directors? 
(a) Would a Commission rule granting shareholders such access be in conflict 
with state law? Is this result consistent with Congressional intent in enacting 
Section 14(a)? 
(b) If the Commission determines to adopt such a rule, what type of rule would 
be most appropriate? What criteria, if any, should be applied to shareholders 
who wish to have access to management's proxy soliciting materials for the 
purpose of making nominations? 
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The Commission initially approached access to the proxy and other gov-
ernance issues cautiously. The Commission's order, characterized as "Stage 
I" of a contemplated three-stage response to concerns about corporate gov-
ernance, proposed modest amendments to the existing disclosure require-
ments concerning board candidates and governance structures. 171 "Stage 
II," to come shortly thereafter in the form of a "comprehensive staff report" 
would, according to the SEC, address some of the more complex questions 
raised in the governance hearings. These issues would include: "existing 
checks on corporate conduct, available shareholder remedies, the role of the 
board of directors and the need for structural board reforms and clarification 
of the directors' responsibilities, and the respective roles of the private sec-
tor, shareholders, the Commission, the self-regulatory organizations and 
Congress in corporate accountability." 172 
Several months later, but before the issuance of any staff report, the Com-
mission adopted the new proxy rules in final form. The Commission added 
substantial new material to the required disclosure on executive compensa-
tion.173 The SEC required directoral candidates to provide information in 
the proxy statement concerning any conflict of interest transactions with the 
corporation, and it required companies to identify standing board commit-
tees, disclose directoral attendance records, and publish information con-
cerning directoral resignations. 174 
(i) For example, should the right to make nominations in management's 
proxy materials be conditioned on the ownership of a minimum per-
centage of dollar value of a class of securities? 
(ii) Should there be a limitation on the number of nominees which must 
be included? If so, what limitation would be appropriate? 
(iii) Should all nominations be screened by a nominating committee com-
posed of outside directors or other disinterested persons? 
(iv) What disclosures should be required of shareholders who utilize 
management's proxy soliciting materials for the purpose of making 
nominations? 
(c) Are there soliciting activities preliminary to (I) making a shareholder nomi-
nation in management's proxy materials or (2) an election contest to which the proxy 
rules should not apply? ... 
(d) Should shareholders utilizing management's proxy materials for the purpose 
of making nominations be subject to the requirements of Rule 14a-ll (Special Provi-
sions applicable to Election Contests)? 
Hearings on Shareholder Communications, SEC Exchange Act Release No. 13,901, [1977-78 
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 81,296, at 88,464 (Aug. 29, 1977). 
171. Shareholder Communications, SEC Exchange Act Release No. 14,970, [1978 Transfer 
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 81,645 (July 18, 1978). 
172. /d. at 80,576. 
173. Management Remuneration, SEC Exchange Act Release No. 15,380, [1978 Transfer 
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 81,765 (Dec. 4, 1978). 
174. Proxy Amendments, SEC Exchange Act Release No. 15,384, [1978 Transfer Binder] 
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 81,766 (Dec. 6, 1978). Several months later, the Commission 
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Nearly two years passed before the publication of the Commission's 
"Stage II" report. The SEC STAFF REPORT ON CORPORATE ACCOUNT A-
BILITY, 175 when finally issued, continued the SEC's conservative approach 
to the question of shareholder access to the proxy. Noting the "growth of 
nominating committees" in the years leading up to the report's publica-
tion, 176 and the objections of the American Bar Association and others to 
the notion of direct shareholder nomination of directoral candidates, 177 the 
Staff proposed further study of nominating committees as a vehicle for 
shareholder empowerment: 
The staff believes that Commission action may be necessary to 
facilitate shareholder participation in the corporate electoral pro-
cess. At the same time, we do not want to discourage the volun-
tary initiatives currently under way toward establishment of 
nominating committees. We therefore recommend examining the 
1980 proxy data with a view toward determining the extent to 
which companies are establishing nominating committees and the 
extent to which these committees are considering shareholder 
nominations. If there is not sufficient progress, the staff recom-
mends that the Commission authorize it to develop a rule which 
would require issuers to establish, beginning two years from adop-
tion of the rule, procedures for shareholder access to issuer proxy 
material for the purpose of making shareholder nominations, 
which procedures would be disclosed in proxy statements. 178 
No evidence exists that the Commission staff followed up on the Staff Re-
port after its issuance or that it reviewed the 1980 proxy materials to mea-
sure the effectiveness of corporate nominating committees. 179 
proposed rules which would mandate a proxy card format permitting shareholders to vote for 
or against individual directoral nominees. SEC Exchange Act Release 16,104 (Aug. 13, 1979). 
These rules were subsequently adopted. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(a) (1986). In addition, these 
rules entitle shareholders to information concerning previous adverse votes against directors 
seeking reelection. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 Schedule 14A, Item 6(g) (1990). 
175. SEC STAFF REPORT ON CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 82. 
176. ld. at 99. 
177. !d. at 108. 
178. ld. at 125-26. 
179. Recall that by 1981, John Shad, President Reagan's appointee, had replaced Chair-
man Williams, President Carter's appointee, and the world view of the SEC had changed sub-
stantially. Chairman Shad was said to have considered the SEC not as an independent agency, 
but "more like 'the Agriculture Department, whose job is to promote the interests of farm-
ers.'" Siedel, Rule 2(e) and Corporate Officers, 39 Bus. LAW. 455, 470 (1984) (quoting 
Welles, John Shad's Biggest Deal, INST'L INVESTOR, Apr. 1982, at 58). 
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The closest attempt to a comprehensive review of nominating committee 
practices during this period was a 1981 Conference Board report 180 that con-
tained the results of a 1980 survey by the American Society of Corporate 
Secretaries of over 300 public companies with nominating committees. The 
survey requested respondents to identify the sources of candidates for board 
membership under the new nominating committee regime: 181 
Prime Source, Good Source, 
Sometimes Used Candidate Source Often Used 
CEO 262 
Committee 177 
members 
Other board 184 
members 
Large or 
influential 
shareholders 
Shareholders 
generally 
12 
• • • • 
• • • • 
52 
92 
124 
66 
16 
Not a Useful 
Source, or Has 
Not Been Used 
1 
21 
7 
204 
259 
This report could hardly support the conclusion that shareholders were 
finally finding a voice in the board nominating process. 
The Commission's next announcement on the subject of shareholder 
access to the proxy was a "concept" release inquiring with ·retrograde 
curiosity "whether security holder access to the issuer's proxy statement 
should be provided under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 or left to 
regulation under state law." 182 This inquiry led to the 1983 amendments to 
Rule 14a-8, substantially curtailing previously authorized means of access to 
the proxy for substantive shareholder proposals. 183 
180. J. BACON, CORPORATE DIRECTORSHIP PRACTICES: THE NOMINATING COMMITTEE 
AND THE DIRECTOR SELECTION PROCESS (1981). 
181. /d. at 25 table 5. . 
182. Shareholder Proxy Proposals, SEC Exchange Act Release No. 19,135, [1982 Transfer 
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 83,262 (Oct. 14, 1982). 
183. See generally Comment, The 1983 Amendments to Shareholder Proposal Rule 14a-8: 
A Retreat from Corporate Democracy?. 59 TUL. L. REV. 161 (1984) (the amendments place 
burdensome restrictions on shareholder participation in corporate governance and also 
represent a movement away from the goals of corporate accountability). 
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Thus, once in the thrall of Reagan-era deregulation, the SEC made no 
further mention of requiring or facilitating direct shareholder nomination of 
directors. Other issues took priority and, under the chairmanship of John 
Shad, the Commission abandoned consideration of access to the proxy as a 
mandatory public policy. This left open the possibility of a corporation-by-
corporation approach to the access issue by means of shareholder proposals. 
Under this approach as well, the Commission, through the staff No-Action 
Letter process, soon abandoned shareholder interests in favor of 
management entrenchment. 
B. The Staff's Reversal on Shareholder Self-Help Efforts 1980-1990 
During the 1980's a number of access proposals were submitted to share-
holders under the shareholder proposal rule. A significant number of these 
proposals attempted to create a mechanism which would enable communica-
tion between shareholders in response to management initiatives, rather than 
create a new mechanism for shareholder initiatives as urged in this Arti-
cle.184 Many proposals, however, focused on the nomination process and 
sought to permit direct nomination of directoral candidates by various cate-
gories of shareholders. 185 
In 1980, a shareholder of Unicare Services, Inc. succeeded, over manage-
ment objection, in placing a proposal on Unicare's annual proxy ballot 
which would permit any three shareholders to nominate a directoral candi-
date for inclusion on the proxy statement alongside management's slate of 
184. A typical proposal, submitted at the 1989 Annual Meeting of Chevron Corporation, 
read as follows: 
RESOL YEO, that the owners of Chevron recommend that the board of directors 
adopt and implement the following policy: 
In any proxy statement sent by Chevron to its shareholders, with respect to 
any issue presented for decision by the shareholders (including candidates for 
election as directors), there shall be allowed statements with regard to that issue 
by beneficial owners of voting equity securities of Chevron. Such statements 
shall receive treatment in the proxy statement, in terms of placement, coverage 
and space, equal to the position of the board of directors or management of 
Chevron. 
CHEVRON CORP., PROXY (Mar. 20, 1989). An identical proposal was submitted to the share-
holders of Unocal Corp. and Amoco Corp. 
185. Proposals to permit direct shareholder nomination have for years been a recurring 
feature of the shareholder proposal landscape. Gaining access to the proxy to permit share-
holders to make direct nomination of socially conscious board candidates was one of the 
planks of "Campaign GM" in 1971. Black, supra note 126, at 300 (Project on Corporate 
Responsibility submitted a resolution to GM requiring management to include in its proxy the 
names of any candidates nominated in a petition signed by 100 shareholders or by the owners 
of 1,500 shares). 
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candidates. 186 In the same year, the International Human Rights Law 
Group submitted a proposal to Mobil Corporation shareholders which 
would permit "a reasonable number of stockholders and/or owners of a rea-
sonable number of shares to place candidates for the Board of Directors on 
the Corporation's proxy statement, and have such candidates voted upon by 
the shareholders." 187 
In 1981, the SEC staff required Union Oil Co. of California to include in 
its proxy materials a proposal which would permit 500 or more individual 
shareholders, "notwithstanding the number of shares they individually or 
collectively represent," 188 to nominate directoral candidates and have their 
nominations presented on the corporate proxy "in the same manner as any 
and all other nominees presented for election." 189 In 1983, the SEC staff 
again required the company-by then renamed Unocal-to include in its 
proxy statement a shareholder proposal which would permit shareholders 
with 125,000 shares or more to nominate directoral candidates and have 
their candidates' names and qualifications "put before other shareholders for 
car~ful consideration by being included in ... the [corporate] proxy." 190 
During this period, issuers raised many objections to shareholder propos-
als seeking access for purposes of directoral nomination. For example, in 
1988, Unocal shareholder Louise B. Wulff submitted a new access propo-
sal.191 Wulff believed her proposal demanded not only shareholder dialogue 
on matters submitted by management for shareholder approval, but also on 
shareholder nomination of directoral candidates. 192 Unocal's management 
strongly resisted the proposal. As permitted under SEC Rule 14a-8(d), 193 
Unocal sought a No-Action Letter from the SEC Division of Corporation 
186. Unicare Services, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (May 13, 1980) (LEXIS, Fedsec li-
brary, Noact tile). 
187. Letter from Richard B. Lillich, Mobil Corp. shareholder, to Margaret M. Day, Secre-
tary, Mobil Corp. (Dec. 17, 1980) (containing shareholder proposal), reprinted in Mobil Corp., 
SEC No-Action Letter (Mar. 3, 1981) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file). 
188. Letter by R.O. Hedley, Secretary, Union Oil Co. of Cal., to SEC (Jan. 7, 1981) (con-
taining shareholder proposal submitted by Eugene W. Dickey, Jr., Union Oil Co. of Cal. share-
holder), reprinted in Union Oil Co. of Cal., SEC No-Action Letter (Jan. 29, 1981) (LEXIS, 
Fedsec library, Noact file), affd, Union Oil Co. of Cal., SEC No-Action Letter (Feb. 20, 1981) 
(LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file). 
189. /d. 
190. Letter from Eugene W. Dickey, Jr., Unocal Corp. shareholder, to George C. Bond of 
Unocal Corp. (Dec. 16, 1982) (containing shareholder proposal), reprinted in Unocal Corp., 
SEC No-Action Letter (Feb. 24, 1983) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file). 
191. Letter from Louise B. Wulff, Unocal Corp. shareholder, to R.O. Hedley of Unocal 
Corp. (Dec. 27, 1987) (containing shareholder proposal), reprinted in Unocal Corp., SEC No-
Action Letter (Feb. 19, 1988) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file). 
192. Interview with Kurt H. Wulff, President, McDep Associates, Inc. (Aug. 10, 1989). 
193. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(d) (1990). 
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Finance authorizing Unocal to exclude the proposal from its proxy state-
ment. Unocal argued, in part, that · the proposal's inclusion would violate 
rule 14a-8(c)(2)194 by permitting differentiai treatment of similarly situated 
shareholders. In particular, Unocal argued that the proposal: 
[W)ould give individual stockholders (or groups) free access to the 
Company's proxy materials if they own $1,000,000 in equity secur-
ities of the Company. Other stockholders would be relegated to 
whatever rights they may have under SEC Rule 14a-8 or which 
might be voluntarily offered to them by the Company. We believe 
this discrimination in favor of large stockholders and to the detri-
ment of small stockholders would cause the Company to violate 
the [equal treatment] principle .... 195 
Unocal also took exception to Wultrs assertion that her proposal would per-
mit shareholder nomination of directoral candidates, arguing that direct 
shareholder nomination would violate rule 14a-11 196 which governs proxy 
contests.197 
The SEC staff rejected Unocal's rule 14a-8(c)(2) "discriminatory treat-
ment" argument 198 and did not address the rule 14a-ll proxy contest argu-
ment, finding that the specific language of Wulff's proposal did not require it. 
In prior decisions, however, the SEC staff had resolved the rule 14a-ll ques-
tion in favor of other proponents, holding that access proposals do not in-
volve a "solicitation ... for the purpose of opposing a [management] 
solicitation ... with respect to the election or removal of directors," 199 and 
so could not be excluded from the ballot on that basis. 200 The staff also 
194. /d. § 240.14a-8(c)(2) ("The registrant may omit a proposal ... [i]f the proposal, if 
implemented, would require the registrant to violate any state law or Federal law of the United 
States, or any law of any foreign jurisdiction to which the registrant is subject . . .. "). 
195. Letter from Morris, Nichcls, Arsht & Tunnell to Unocal Corp. and Gibson, Dunn & 
Crutcher (Feb. 11, 1988), reprinted in Unocal Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (Feb. 19, 1988) 
(LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file). 
196. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-11 ( 1990) (special rules applicable to solicitations "with respect 
to the election or removal of directors at any annual or special meeting . .. . "). 
197. Letter from Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher to SEC (Dec. 23, 1987), reprinted in Unocal 
Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (Feb. 19, 1988) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file). 
198. Unocal Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (Feb. 19, 1988) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact 
file). 
199. See supra note 196. 
200. See, e.g., Unocal Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (Feb. 24, 1983) (LEXIS, Fedsec li-
brary, Noact file) (staff declined to exclude proposal that would provide access to shareholders 
with 125,000 shares as violative of rule 14a-ll because "[i]t appear[ed] to the staff that the 
proposal relate[ d) to the selection in subsequent years of nominees for election to the Board of 
Directors and not to a solicitation in oppos.ition to management's nominees"); Union Oil Co. 
of Cal., SEC No-Action Letter (Feb. 20, 1981) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file), affg, 
Union Oil Co. of Cal., SEC No-Action Letter (Jan. 29, 1981) (LEX IS, Fedsec library, Noact 
file) (staff declined to exclude proposal that would permit 500 or more shareholders to collec-
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rejected management's invocation of rule 14a-8(c)(8)201 for the proposition 
that access proposals for the purpose of shareholder nomination could be 
excluded because they "relate[ ] to an election to office. " 202 
The SEC staff over the years had repeatedly rejected management objec-
tions to shareholder access proposals. In 1986, for example, a shareholder of 
Newbery Corporation proposed a bylaw amendment that would permit ac-
cess to the proxy for purposes of directoral nomination by shareholders eligi-
ble to submit shareholder proposals. 203 Newbery's management attempted 
to exclude the proposal under rule 14a-8(c)(9),204 arguing that any nomina-
tion by a shareholder would by definition be "counter to a proposal to be 
submitted by the registrant at the meeting. " 205 Presumably because the pro-
posal itself was not "counter to" any management proposal pending before 
the shareholders that year, the staff held the exclusion inapplicable, and de-
nied the requested No-Action Letter. 206 
In 1987, a shareholder of Chittenden Corporation proposed a mechanism 
for shareholder nomination of "opposition candidates," including placement 
of the nominees' "names, biographies, and photographs ... in Annual Share-
tively nominate a directoral candidate as violative of rule 14a-11, noting "rather than violating 
rule 14a-ll, in our view, the proposal would only require that the Board of Directors take the 
steps necessary to establish procedures [for direct nomination]"). 
201. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(8) (1990) (management may omit a proposal, and any state-
ment in support thereof, from its proxy statement "if the proposal relates to an election to 
office"). 
202. Unicare Services, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (May 13, 1980) (LEXIS, Fedsec li-
brary, Noact file) ("in our view this proposal does not related [sic] to the election of directors 
at a particular meeting, but rather to the procedure to be followed to select nominees in gen-
eral"); see also Unocal Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (Feb. 24, 1983) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, 
Noact file) ("this proposal does not relate to the election of directors at a particular meeting, 
but rather to the procedure to be followed to select nominees in general"); Mobil Corp., SEC 
No-Action Letter (Mar. 3, 1981) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file) (access proposal is 
"merely procedural in nature" and does not invoke rule 14a-8(c)(8)). 
203. Newbery Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (Aug. II, 1986) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, 
Noact file). 
204. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(9) (1990) (management may omit a proposal, and any state-
ment in support thereof, from its proxy statement "if the proposal is counter to a proposal to 
be submitted by the registrant at the meeting"). 
205. !d. 
206. Newbery Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (Aug. II, 1986) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, 
Noact file); see also American Airlines, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (Feb. 26, 1980) (LEXIS, 
Fedsec library, Noact file) (proposal permitting any three shareholders to propose a candidate 
for inclusion in management's slate of directors is required to be included in the annual proxy) 
affd. American Airlines, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (Mar. 10, 1980) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, 
Noact file). 
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holder Meeting Notices. " 207 Management objected on the ground, among 
others, that the proposal related to a personal grievance and was beyond the 
power of the corporation to effectuate. 208 The staff rejected all of Chit-
tenden's claims. 209 
The staff, in at least one case, overtly counseled shareholder proponents to 
maximize the chances that the proponents' access proposal could be placed 
on the ballot. In 1982, a group calling itself the TWA Shareholder Project, 
Inc., proposed that "[t]he Board of Directors shall include in their slate of 
nominees for election as Directors at each Annual Meeting at least four ac-
tive employees ofTWA (exclusive of corporate officers)."210 While ruling 
that the proposal, as drafted, unlawfully intruded upon the discretionary au-
thority of the board under Delaware law,211 the staff suggested that: 
If, however, the form of the proposal were changed to a recom-
mendation or request that the Board take the necessary steps to 
effect the action contemplated by the proposal, we believe this de-
fect would be cured. As amended, staff is unable to conclude that 
[there is] a sufficient legal basis for the proposition that Delaware 
law would necessarily prohibit a by-law amendment requiring cer-
tain directors be nominated by the Company's shareholder-em-
ployees. We note in this connection that shareholders generally 
have no choice in the nomination of the directors upon whose elec-
tion they vote.212 
In light of this history of approval for shareholder access proposals, the 
SEC staff's reversal on the access to the proxy issue in consecutive No-Ac-
207. Letter from John Jennings Crapo, Chittenden Corp. shareholder, to John F. McAteer 
of Chittenden Corp. (Feb. 26, 1987) (containing shareholder proposal), reprinted in Chittenden 
Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (Mar. 10, 1987) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file). 
208. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(4), (6) (1990). 
209. Chittenden Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (Mar. 10, 1987) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, 
Noact file). 
210. Letter from Richard P. Barthelemy, Secretary, TWA Shareholder Project, Inc., to L. 
Edwin Smart, Chairman of the Board, Trans World Corp. (Jan. 12, 1980) (containing share-
holder proposal), reprinted in Trans World Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (Feb. 8, 1982) 
(LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file). 
211. Trans World Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (Feb. 19, 1982) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, 
Noact file). In a similar case, a proposal submitted to Public Service Electric & Gas Co. set-
ting aside two seats on the board of directors for "two individual Shareholders to be selected 
by nomination by any duly qualified Shareholder" was excluded because its language was di-
rectory rather than precatory. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., SEC No-Action Letter (Feb. 2, 
1978) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file). 
212. Trans World Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (Feb. 19, 1982) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, 
Noact file). 
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tion Letters to Bank of Boston,213 Unocal,214 Amoco,215 and Thermo Elec-
tron216 in early 1990 was a surprise. Typical of those rejected, the Amoco 
proposal provided: 
RESOLVED that the board of directors take whatever steps are 
necessary to provide that, effective with the 1991 annual meeting, 
in the event a shareholder or group of shareholders representing 
more than $100,000 in market value of shares nominates a candi-
date for a position on the board of directors and secures that candi-
date's consent to be so nominated, that candidate's name and 
accompanying biographical data shall appear in the corporate 
proxy statement, and that candidate's name shall appear on the 
corporate ballot sent to shareholders, in the same manner as if the 
candidate had been nominated by the Nominating Committee.217 
This proposal did not "set aside" board positions for any particular class 
of candidates,218 include the names of any proposed directoral nominees,219 
213. Bank of Boston, SEC No-Action Letter (Jan. 26, 1990) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact 
file) (proposal to permit any shareholder eligible to make a shareholder proposal to make a 
directoral nomination may be excluded from the proxy pursuant to rule 14a-8(c)(8)). 
214. Unocal Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (Feb. 6, 1990) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact 
file) (proposal to permit any shareholder who owns or controls at least 125,000 shares to make 
a directoral nomination may be excluded from the proxy pursuant to rule 14a-8(c)(8)). 
215. Amoco Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (Feb. 14, 1990) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact 
file) (proposal to permit any shareholder or group of shareholders representing more than 
$100,000 in market value of the company's shares to make a directoral nomination may be 
excluded from the proxy pursuant to rule 14a-8(c)(8)). 
216. Thermo Electron Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (Mar. 22, 1990) (LEXIS, Fedsec li-
brary, Noact file) (proposal to permit any shareholder eligible to make a shareholder proposal 
to make a directoral nomination may be excluded from the proxy pursuant to rule 14a-8(c)(8)). 
217. Letter from Jane E. Klewin to SEC (Dec. 21, 1989) (containing shareholder proposal 
submitted by Kurt H. Wulff, Amoco Corp. shareholder), reprinted in Amoco Corp., SEC No-
Action Letter (Feb. 14, 1990) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file). The author of this Article 
served as counsel to Mr. Wulff in connection with this proposal in the No-Action proceedings 
before the SEC. 
218. Cf Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (May 9, 1985) (LEXIS, 
Fedsec library, Noact file) (proposal requiring a corporate employee to be put on manage-
ment's slate of nominees for directors may be excluded from the proxy); Allied Corp., SEC 
No-Action Letter (Jan. 5, 1984) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file) (proposal to set aside a 
board position for a non-management salaried employee is excludable from the proxy); Braniff 
Int'l Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (Feb. 5, 1982) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file) (propo-
sal requiring directors to nominate four employees to the corporate board "relates to the elec-
tion of specific individuals to the Company's Board ... and thus is excludable under Rule 14a-
8(c)(8)"); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., SEC No-Action Letter (Feb. 12, 1979) (LEXIS, Fedsec 
library, Noact file) (proposal to set aside board positions for representatives of the American 
Friends Service Committee, Friends of the Earth, or the Mobilization for Survival, as well as 
for representatives of registrant's labor unions, may be excluded from the proxy); Chrysler 
Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (Jan. 25, 1977) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file) (proposal to 
set aside a board position for a nominee sponsored by the Stockholder Employees Committee 
of Chrysler Corp. may be excluded from the proxy). But see IBM Corp., SEC No-Action 
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or create a "dual class board" in violation of state Iaw.220 The proponent 
fulfilled all the standing requirements of rule 14a-8.221 His proposal was 
neither duplicative of earlier failed proposals, and hence excludable under 
rule 14a-8(c)(l2),222 nor "vague and indefinite and, therefore, potentially 
misleading," and hence excludable under rule 14a-8(c)(3).223 Rather, the 
proposal provided a procedure by which certain shareholders could make 
nominations for inclusion on Amoco's proxy statement in future years, 
similiar to the proposals at Unicare,224 Mobil,225 Unocal,226 American Air-
lines, 227 N ewbery, 228 and Chittenden,229 which had successfully withstood 
challenge before the SEC in preceding years. 
By penriitting Amoco to exclude this proposal from its proxy, the SEC 
staff apparently changed its view of both rule 14a-8(c)(8), the "related to an 
election" exception to the shareholder proposal rule, and rule 14a-ll, the 
"proxy contest rule." In a letter promising no action if Amoco excluded the 
proposal from the Amoco proxy, the staff stated "(i]nsofar as it seeks to 
Letter (Dec. 19, 1985) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file) (refusing to exclude a proposal to 
establish a board position in which the director would "represent the interest of [IBM] Share-
holders who are Company employees"). 
219. Cf Amerco, SEC No-Action Letter (July 12, 1989) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact 
file) (proponent's submission of a slate of candidates to be included in the company's annual 
proxy excluded based on rule 14a-8(c)(8)); Savin Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (Mar. 15, 1989) 
(LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file) (same); Care Enter., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (May 5, 
1987) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file) (same); Santa Fe S. Pac. Corp., SEC No-Action 
Letter (Feb. 19, 1987) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file) (same); Simplicity Pattern Co., Inc., 
SEC No-Action Letter (Mar. 21, 1980) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file) (same). 
220. Cf Detroit Edison Co., SEC No-Action Letter (Feb. 13, 1980) (LEXIS, Fedsec li-
brary, Noact file) (proposal to allow shareholders to nominate additional class of directors 
creates two separate classes of directors, unequal in number, in violation of§ 506(1) of the 
Michigan Business Corporation Act). 
221. Cf Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co., SEC No-Action Letter (Apr. 13, 1987) (LEXIS, 
Fedsec library, Noact file) (proponent's sale of his shares made him ineligible to submit 
proposal). 
222. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(l2) (1990); see, e.g., Unocal Corp., SEC No-Action Letter 
(Feb. 23, 1984) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file) (proposal to adopt certain directoral nomi-
nating procedures is duplicative of proposals included in the company's 1981 and 1983 proxy 
materials and excludable under rule 14a-8(c)(l2)). 
223. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(3) (1990); see, e.g., Bank of New England, SEC No-Action 
Letter (Feb. 4, 1990) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file) (access proposal excluded because it 
is vague and indefinite); Commonwealth Energy Sys., SEC No-Action Letter (Feb. 27, 1989) 
(LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file) (same); American Elec. Power Co., SEC No-Action Letter 
(Jan. 27, 1978) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file) (same). 
224. See supra notes 186, 202 and accompanying text. 
225. See supra notes 187, 202 and accompanying text. 
226. See supra notes 188-90, 198 and accompanying text. 
227. See supra note 206 and accompanying text. 
228. /d. 
229. See supra note 207 and accompanying text. 
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implement a common ballot procedure, it appears that this proposal, rather 
than establishing procedures for nomination or qualification generally, 
would establish a procedure that may result in contested elections to the 
board which is a matter more appropriately addressed under rule 14a-
ll."no 
This change of position by the SEC staff was not its only reversal in 1990. 
During the same proxy season, the staff reversed itself on proposals related 
to golden parachutes231 and the cessation of production of dangerous prod-
ucts. 232 These changes of position, however, favored shareholder propo-
nents, while the statrs new position on the access to the proxy issue favored 
incumbent management. 
A simple reason for the staff's change of course might be that the 1990 
position is more "correct" under existing law than the staff's previous posi-
tions. In prior years, the staff may have failed to consider the long-term 
implications of their decisions because they assumed that access proposals, 
like most shareholder proposals, would not command substantial share-
holder support and could not win against management opposition. This as-
sumption, however, was beginning to prove unsupportable. By 1990, an 
increasing number of shareholder proposals, particularly those initiated by 
institutional investors, were winning majority votes.233 Accordingly, the 
SEC staff may have, for the first time, considered the actual consequences of 
shareholders enjoying direct access to the proxy, and found it unacceptable 
under existing proxy contest rules. 
V. THE WISDOM AND PITFALLS OF PROVIDING DIRECT ACCESS TO 
THE PROXY 
All of the proposals discussed in Parts III and IV invite obvious and more 
subtle objections. Some critics cite the practical problems accompanying the 
implementation of an access to the proxy rule, while others focus on the 
230. Amoco Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (Feb. 14, 1990) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact 
file). 
231. Transamerica Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (Jan. 10, 1990) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, 
Noact file) (proposal that the board discontinue goldeQ parachute agreements with company 
executives may not be excluded under rule 14a-8(c)(7)). 
232. See Philip Morris Co. Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (Feb. 13, 1990) (LEXIS, Fedsec 
library, Noact file) (proposal requiring company to cease producing tobacco products by De-
cember 31, 1999, is not excludable under rules 14a-8(c)(l), (2) or (7)), ajfd, Philip Morris Co., 
SEC No-Action Letter (Mar. 14, 1990) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file) . 
233. In the 1990 proxy season, more shareholder proposals passed than in the preceding 40 
years combined. 5 USA ADVOCATE No. 7, at I (July 1990). 
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notion of corporate democracy itself. 234 . After identifying, exploring, and 
ultimately refuting the most colorable of these objections, this Article argues 
that affirmative reasons exist for embracing a policy of limited shareholder 
access to the proxy. 
A. The Recurring Objections 
1. Overseeing and Responding to Contested Directora/ Elections Would 
Waste Managerial Resources 
Some critics worry that encouraging election contests by providing share-
holder access to the ballot may discourage competent incumbent directors 
from seeking renomination and dissuade others selected by the incumbent 
board, or a nominating committee, from putting themselves forward and 
risking public rejection. 235 This argument comports with other protectionist 
arguments which seek to defend the status quo by discouraging competitive 
behavior. Thus, for example, corporate managers who lobby for tariffs or 
other barriers to exclude quality foreign products from the market for goods 
and services may also prefer costly proxy fights to exclude directoral chal-
lengers from the market for corporate control. 
It is questionable whether management-selected directoral candidates 
would refuse nomination in the face of competing bidders. Directoral ser-
vice provides substantial personal benefits to those chosen by management, 
quite apart from financial considerations. 236 First, exposure to other enter-
prises provides learning and networking opportunities. 237 Second, selection 
by management to serve on a public company's board carries substantial 
prestige. 238 For service providers, such as commercial bankers, investment 
bankers, or outside counsel, board service offers a means of bonding a lucra-
tive business relationship. Moreover, for those board members with previ-
ous service, the advantages of incumbency and "ballot position" within 
234. See generally Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement. 35 VAND. L. REV. 1259 
(1983) (criticizing the movement toward further empowerment of shareholders). 
235. See Feis, supra note 126, at 640; Comment, Shareholder Democracy: A Description 
and Critical Analysis of the Proxy System, 60 N.C.L. REv. 145, 163 (1981). 
236. See supra text accompanying note 87. 
237. See J. loRSCH, PAWNS OR POTENTATES: THE REALITY OF AMERICA'S CORPORATE 
BoARDS 26 (1990) (opportunity to learn is rated as the second most important reason cited by 
directors for their acceptance of a board position); see also M. MACE, DIRECTORS: MYTH 
AND REALITY 104-05 (1986 ed.) (one of two principal reasons why executives will serve as 
directors is the opportunity to learn something new). 
238. M. MACE, supra note 237, at 105-U6. "Often it is like being invited to join an exclu-
sive club." C. ANDERSON & R . ANTHONY, THE NEW CORPORATE DIRECTORS: INSIGHTS 
FOR BoARD MEMBERS AND EXECUTIVES 95 (1986). 
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management's slate may provide additional incentives to run for 
reelection. 239 
The real question is not whether the prospect of an election contest scares 
off the occasional incumbent, but whether that prospect is likely to stimulate 
boards to better directoral performance. As discussed in the next section, 
psychological studies suggest that the existence of a challenger may result in 
better board decisionmaking. 
2. A Diversified Board is Likely to be an Ineffective Decisionmaking 
Body 
Some observers argue that a high degree of homogeneity and cohesiveness 
leads to a more effective board of directors, and that the presence of "constit-
uency directors," including those elected by cumulative voting to represent 
shareholder interests, disrupts the decision making process. 240 Others chal-
lenge the notion that a homogeneous board, especially one selected primarily 
by the CEO, can perform effectively. 241 Social scientists studying the condi-
tions which characterize efficient decisionmaking have found that homoge-
neity and cohesiveness, taken too far, can impair decisionmaking to the point 
where, in the jargon of social psychologists, it becomes "pathological." This 
impairment can result from premature closure of discussion, intolerance of 
deviant points of view, pressure towards consensus, or the phenomenon re-
ferred to as "groupthink. " 242 
"Groupthink" is "a mode of thinking that people engage in when they are 
deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, when the members' strivings for una-
nimity override their motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses 
of action. " 243 It is common in the deliberations of corporate boards selected 
in the traditional manner. 
239. See Pound, Proxy Contests and the Efficiency of Shareholder Oversight, 20 J. FIN. 
EcoN. 237 (1988) (noting the vote-getting advantages enjoyed by management in any proxy 
contest due to unique characteristics of proxy voting); cj Sangmeister v. Woodard, 565 F.2d 
460 (7th Cir.), cert. denied. 435 U.S. 939 (1978) (citing research findings correlating first ballot 
position with electoral success). 
240. Haft, Business Decisions by the New Board: Behavioral Science and Corporate Law, 80 
MICH. L. REV. l, 22-24 (1981). 
241. E.g .. Brudney, supra note 74, at 622 (the effectiveness of a traditional board is limited 
by "structural bias," inadequate resources and the lack of economic incentives to monitor). 
242. See generally Swap, Destructive Effects of Groups on Individuals. in GROUP DECIS!ON 
MAKING 69-95 (1984) (groups exert pressure on members to reach a consensual decision that 
is not necessarily the best decision). 
243. I. JANIS, GROUPTHINK: PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF POLICY DECISIONS AND FIAS-
COES 9 (2d ed. 1982). 
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Boards are frequently constrained by what one director has called the 
"cult of politeness."244 Another knowledgeable commentator has described 
"a subtle set of unspoken norms" which inhibit robust discourse within the 
confines of the boardroom. 245 This pattern of conscious civility, while con-
ducive to a high comfort level in group situations, may also interfere with 
the board's monitoring function. For example, many directors suppress 
their concerns in board meetings for fear of appearing disrespectful of the 
CEO or of indicating a vote of "no confidence." 246 Furthermore, cultural 
norms mandate that directors interact only in structured board settings and 
solely as peers, rather than informally with any one of them asserting leader-
ship over the others. 247 Boards rarely vote other than unanimously on issues 
of importance to the CEO. 248 
These behavioral patterns can ultimately lead to an institutional inability 
to challenge the management-delivered view of corporate affairs and a result-
ing failure of the board to exercise sound and independent business judg-
ment. 249 As one social psychologist noted, "[g]roup members may be so 
concerned with maintaining positive interpersonal relations and reducing 
conflict that they lose the ability or willingness to critically evaluate the risks 
and advantages of decision alternatives. " 250 
Providing, within limits, for a more diverse and heterogeneous board of 
directors is likely to improve, rather than impair, the quality of decisionmak-
ing.251 This is particularly true where "new" board members gain their seats 
244. The Role of the Shareholder in the· Corporate World: Hearings Before the Subcomm. 
on Citizens and Shareholders Rights and Remedies of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 73 (1977) (statement of Mary Gardiner Jones, Pres., Nat'! Consumer League). 
245. · J . LoRSCH, supra note 237, at 91. 
246. /d. at 93; M. MACE, supra note 237, at 55 . This is particularly true among directors 
who themselves are CEO's. One of the traditional mores of corporate upward mobility is 
never to contradict or embarrass one's boss or "patron" in the presence of others, and always 
to appear totally loyal to him or her. R. JACKALL, MORAL MAZES: THE WORLD OF CORPO-
RATE MANAGERS 19 (1988). 
247. J. LoRSCH, supra note 237, at 93. 
248. In a recent book about his experiences on the board of General Motors, Inc .. Ross 
Perot disclosed that when he voted against a proposed acquisition of Hughes Aircraft Co. in 
1985, it was the first time since the Depression that any member of the GM board had dis-
sented in any board decision. D. LEVIN, IRRECONCILABLE DIFFERENCES 251 ( 1989). 
249. E.g .. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) (directors failed to challenge 
any aspect of or even to read proposed merger agreement). 
250. Swap, supra note 242, at 83. 
251. See, e.g .• C. ANDERSON & R. ANTHONY, supra note 238, at 90. The authors argue 
that: 
(One] dimension of a good board is a balanced membership-balance of occupation, 
experience, age, gender, race, geographical representation, and so on. In general it is 
beneficial to have people from several different industries on the board. They can 
bring important insights to board meetings, based on their varied experiences. It is 
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following direct nomination by a substantial shareholder. In his landmark 
study of corporate boards, 252 Myles Mace found that traditionally selected 
outside directors are especially passive as a group, are hesitant to risk embar-
rassment either to themselves or to the CEO, and seldom ask discerning 
questions about ongoing or proposed corporate activities.253 However, 
"[o]utside board members who own or represent the ownership of substantial 
stock in the company are much more likely to ask discerning questions than 
an outside director who does not own stock, or at least not very many 
shares. "254 In addition, the presence on the board of one such director en-
courages other outsiders to get involved in the questioning of the CE0.255 
The point is not to stimulate rancor among a factionalized board or to 
create a new model of board composition in which shareholder nominated 
directors are expected to play some oppositional role. 256 Rather, the goal is 
/d. 
also helpful to have someone on the board with experience in the public sector, as 
this person contributes a perspective frequently missed by the business person. An 
academic can add still another perspective. Our point is that a board consisting of 
persons with varied backgrounds can engage in discussions with a richness and 
breadth that inevitably lead to better decision making. A board with diverse mem-
bership will also have an extensive network of contacts throughout industry, govern-
ment, and the professions, that can be useful to the company in many ways. 
252. M. MACE, supra note 237. 
253. /d. at 52-53. 
254. /d. at 61 (emphasis added). 
255. /d. at 64. 
256. Absent some sense of unity among elected directors, a single director nominated by 
anyone other than those on the official nominating committee might well face the treatment 
portrayed in a recent NEw YoRKER cartoon: 
"Thank you. We're all refreshed and challenged by your unique 
point of "iew. Now, we have many serious matters to discuss today, 
so I suggest we stick with our agreed-upon agenda." 
Reprinted with permission from the NEW YoRKER 
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to create an environment in which decisionmakers bring diverse perspectives 
to the process, optimize their individual strengths, and resist the centripetal 
forces of "groupthink. "2s7 Many models exist suggesting that this bonding 
process can work. 2s8 · 
If one accepts the monitoring role of the board, then any mechanism 
which stimulates attentiveness and directoral activity is desirable. However, 
giving shareholders the right to nominate is not equivalent to ensuring their 
ability to elect a director of their own selection. Even where management-
nominated candidates prevail over shareholder nominees, the expressed con-
cerns of the nominators and the discontent over board actions which aroused 
slumbering investors are likely to sensitize the newly elected board members. 
The availability and occasional use of direct nomination, rather than degrad-
ing the board's deliberative processes, will serve to focus the board on share-
holder gain. 
3. "Shareholder Democracy" is Unlikely to Stimulate Shareholder 
Participation 
Historically, shareholders have been described as passive and apathetic in 
proxy voting.2s9 Economists argue that many shareholders do not vote, or 
do not vote against management's position, because it is seldom in their eco-
nomic interests to do so. The outcome of the vote seldom repays the cost of 
the time a shareholder must expend to study the various proxy proposals 
and cast a well-informed vote.260 Additionally, a "free-rider" problem exists 
in that the shareholder who is willing and able to spend the necessary time 
and resources to take a position lacks the incentive to organize others261 
257. It is possible, of course, that "new" board members, in seeking a sense of belonging on 
the board, will soon be co-opted by the incumbent majority. Professor George W. Dent, Jr., 
describes this phenomenon in his article Toward Unifying Ownership and Control in the Public 
Corporation, 1989 Wts. L. REV. 881, 899 . . 
258. There has been considerable stud~ on the dynamics by which small decisionmaking 
groups, comprised of participants with diverse, even competitive, perspectives, can most effec-
tively reach consensus and achieve "decision quality." See, e.g., Smith, Petersen, Johnson & 
Johnson, The Effects of Controversy and Concurrence Seeking on Effective Decision Making, 
126 J. Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 237 (1986); Tjosvold & Field, Effect of Concurrence, Controversy, 
and Consensus on Group Decision Making, 125 J. Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 355 (1985); Wall, 
Galanes & Love, Small Task-Oriented Groups: Conflict, Conflict Management, Satisfaction, 
and Decision Quality, 18 SMALL GROUP BEHAV. 31 (1987). 
259. A. BERLE & G. MEANS, supra note 44, at 81; Easterbrook & Fischel, Voting in Corpo-
rate Law, 26 J.L. & EcoN. 395-97 (1983); Manne, Some Theoretical Aspects of Share Voting, 64 
COLUM. L . REV. 1427, 1440-41 (1964). 
260. Fischel, supra note 234, at 1277. 
261. /d.; see also Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 259, at 397; Gordon, Ties that Bond: 
Dual Class Common Stock and the Problem of Shareholder Choice, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 44 
(1988). 
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"[b]ecause no compulsory cost-sharing mechanism exists in these circum-
stances, and because no single shareholder can capture the whole gain to 
shareholders generally from the proposal's defeat, there will be insufficient 
incentive to organize opposition."262 
These assumptions, however, are proving increasingly unsupportable. 
Shareholders today vote in very high numbers, given the stakes usually in-
volved. 263 They differentiate among the issues presented to them, favoring 
some management proposals by wide majorities and others by narrow mar-
gins. 264 Moreover, notwithstanding the free-rider problem, shareholders can 
and do organize when it is beneficial to them. What else would explain the 
rising percentage of votes cast for shareholder proposals in recent years?265 
No longer do only religious groups join together in proxy voting cam-
paigns. 266 Now other groups of investors, seeking economic as well as social 
reforms, organize collective strategies. 267 
Institutional investors in particular are learning to overcome collective 
choice and free-rider problems when they believe their actions will suffi-
ciently enhance share value to justify the costs incurred. For example, in 
April 1989, CalPERS and its Pennsylvania counterpart, the Pennsylvania 
Public Employees Retirement System, joined together to defeat two anti-
takeover measures submitted by management for shareholder approval at 
Honeywell Inc.'s annual meeting. The proposals were routine shark repel-
lents that would have created a classified board with staggered terms and 
262. Gordon, supra note 261, at 44; Fischel, supra note 234, at 1277. 
263. See Appendix A (a sampling of available information regarding recent shareholder 
voting). Many factors may account for the high voter turnout reflected in this sampling from 
the 1989 proxy season. Some voting may have been stimulated by the presence of the Depart-
ment of Labor, which had threatened an audit of ERISA fund proxy voting practices. See 
infra note 283 and accompanying text. Other factors may have included the presence of eco-
nomically significant shareholder proposals (such as those which would require termination of 
poison pills) and the exhortive encouragement of the various proxy voting consulting firms. 
See infra notes 280-87 and accompanying text. 
264. See Appendix. 
265. See O'Hara, Both Shareholders, Management Rack Up Proxy Wins, 7 IRRC CORP. 
GOVERNANCE BULL 90 (July/Aug. 1990) ("At least 20 resolutions at 12 companies have 
received majorities of the shares voted, and average shareholder support for almost every type 
of proposal is running ahead-in some cases far ahead-of last year's figures."). 
266. The Interfaith Center for Corporate Responsibility, an affiliate of the National Coun-
cil of Churches, has organized proxy campaigns among shareholding churches, religious or-
ders, and others since 1971. 
267. An example is the campaign of the United Shareholders Association, announced in 
the summer of 1989 and executed during the 1990 proxy season, entitled USA Target 50. This 
campaign aimed to secure four reforms at 50 public companies: confidential proxy voting, 
elimination of poison pill~. shareholder approval of golden parachutes, and exemption from 
state antitakeover statutes. 4 USA ADVOCATE No. 8, at 4c5 (Aug. 1989). 
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abolished shareholder action by written consent. 268 Though CalPERS and 
the Pennsylvania fund together represented less than 5% of Honeywell's 
ownership, they organized a campaign among other institutional investors to 
defeat these proposals. 269 Their joint efforts took three weeks to execute and 
cost approximately $350,000, primarily for the services of a professional 
proxy solicitor. 210 The organizers of this collective action now estimate that 
Honeywell's shareholders benefitted by a rise in share value from $70 per 
share when they began to $79 per share, or a total of $388 million in equity 
value, when the defeat of the anti-takeover measures was announced three 
weeks later. 271 
The successful Honeywell initiative was based on the willingness of insti-
tutional shareholders to band together and vote as a group. Underlying any 
contemporary discussion of the access issue is the fact that the majority of 
shareholders in public companies are no longer mom-and-pop investors with 
tiny stakes in a handful of companies. Rather, estimates now indicate that 
more than 50% of all shares of public companies are held by well-informed 
institutional investors. 272 Due to the size of their asset base, 273 many of 
these investors control percentage ownerships in each of several companies 
268. HONEYWELL, INC., PROXY, 17-20 (Mar. 23, 1989). 
269. Honeywell: The Value of Shareholder Activism, 4 USA ADVOCATE No. 9, at 3 (Sept. 
1989) [hereinafter Honeywell]. 
270. Address by Nell Minow, General Counsel, Institutional Shareholders Services, Inc., 
to United Shareholders Association Annual Meeting (June 26, 1989). 
271. Honeywell, supra note 269, at 3. Organizers of the Honeywell initiative also point out 
that, following the annual meeting, Honeywell's management restructured the company in 
July, 1989 by issuing a substantial dividend, offering to repurchase up to 23% of the com-
pany's stock, and selling its declining weapons systems business and most of its interest in a 
Japanese joint venture. By early August 1989, Honeywell's stock was selling at $89 per share. 
/d. 
272. The breakdown of ownership has been estimated as follows: 
Private Pension Funds 
State and Local Employee Retirement Pians 
Mutual Funds 
Life Insurance Companies 
Foreign 
Banks, as Trustee 
Foundations, etc. 
15.5% 
5.1% 
5.4% 
2.8% 
5.6% 
15.3% 
4.3% 
54.0% 
W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS CASES AND MATERIALS 144 (concise 6th ed. 
1988). 
273. Public and private pension funds alone now control over $2.6 trillion in assets. Light, 
The Power of Pension Funds, Bus. WEEK,. Nov. 6, 1989, at 154. 
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sufficient to demand management's attention. 274 In addition, a majority of 
public companies have a concentration of institutional owners275 such that 
coalitions may be formed and, as in the Honeywell case, joint electoral ef-
forts may be easily undertaken. 
As recently as the 1970's, institutional investors were reluctant, even in 
the face of constituent pressures, to involve themselves in governance mat-
ters. 276 That is no longer the case. Respectable institutions, as well as the 
traditional self-promoters, are bringing shareholder proposals to the corpo-
rate ballot277 and seeking other means of influencing significant management 
decisions. 278 These investors are seeking to exercise a "voice" as well as an 
"exit" option279 as owners of corporate equity. 
At least three reasons account for this increased willingness to participate 
in governance decisions. First, and particularly with the decline of the junk 
bond market, institutional investors increasingly take equity positions, 
rather than investing in debt. As they do so, and especially as managed 
funds strategically invest in substantial equity blocks rather than more 
broadly diversifying their portfolios, 280 their ability to exit quickly may be 
274. For example, CalPERS owns between .7 and 1.0% of nearly 3,000 public companies. 
Telephone interview with Kayla J. Gillan, CaiPERS Assistant General Counsel (May 17, 
1990). The press may assist institutions in their effort to influence corporate policy. When the 
state of Michigan announced its intention to vote its General Motors holdings, comprising 
approximately 1.5% of the company's common stock, against a proposed executive pension 
plan, the story was flagged on the front page of the Wall Street Journal. GM's Plan to Boost 
Executive's Pensions Draws Fire: One Big Holder is to Vote 'No,' Wall St. J., May 14, 1990, at 
AI, col. 2, and A4, col. 2. 
275. Conard, Beyond Managerialism: Investor Capitalism?, 22 MICH. J.L. REFORM 117, 
133 (1988) (66% of the public companies studied had 200 or fewer institutional owners). 
276. Schwartz, The Public-Interest Proxy Contest: Reflections on Campaign GM. 69 MICH. 
L. REV. 421, 502-505 (1971) (at several universities, the trustees, in the face of advisory com-
mittee directives to the contrary, voted with management during Campaign GM). 
277. See, e.g., Parker, Funds Gird For Proxy Season: 2 Shareholder's Resolutions Make 
Their Debut on 1990 Ballots, PENSIONS & INVESTMENT AGE, Nov. 13, 1989, at 92 (describing 
(I) TIAA-CREF proposal to require a shareholder vote on any plan to issue a large block of 
stock to a single investor; (2) CalPERS and Connecticut Trust Fund's proposal regarding the 
counting of abstentions; (3) NYCERS' and CaiPERS' proposals urging opt-out from Delaware 
anti-takeover statute; (4) CalPERS' and CaiSTRS' proposals to create shareholder advisory 
committees; and (5) Wisconsin State Investment Board and State of Connecticut Trust Fund's 
proposals concerning poison pills). 
278. See infra note 319 and accompanying text. 
279. The terms derive from A.O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LoYALTY (1970). 
280. See Conard, supra note 275, at 132. 
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encumbered.281 As a consequence, the voice option becomes more 
compelling. 282 
Second, some institutional investors are now subject to regulatory over-
sight of their voting behavior. In particular, the Department of Labor, in a 
widely published advisory letter issued in February 1988, characterized the 
right to vote corporate stock as an ERISA "plan asset," thereby subjecting 
ERISA trustees and asset managers to liability for voting without due 
care. 283 The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal Re-
serve Board also review the exercise of equity voting rights during bank ex-
aminations. 284 Regulators are now encouraging institutional investors to 
give careful thought to the use of their equity voting power, rather than 
simply deferring to managerial objectives or, as has recently occurred, re-
sponding uncritically to short-term market incentives.28s These circum-
stances have resulted in an enhanced sense of stewardship toward share 
beneficiaries and responsibility in governance matters. 
Third, new practices, such as the proxy voting protocol286 and the availa-
bility of shared cost research,287 have reduced the per share cost of informa-
tion gathering and voting. Moreover, as share ownership continues to shift 
from individuals to large collective entities, this cost will continue to decline. 
Because institutional investors employ professional management and 
many must annually account for their voting behavior, 288 they are more 
likely than individuals to cast proxy votes, and their votes are more likely to 
be well informed. Typically, institutional investors can more effectively eval-
uate the performance of management, and the strength of management nom-
inees, than most individual investors. Moreover, through professional 
281 . Index funds, which now comprise a substantial percentage of all public and private 
pension funds, by definition cannot exit. 
282. Cf. Schwartz, supra note 276, at 495 ("The 'Wall Street Rule' ... may not be wholly 
feasible for institutions holding large blocks of stock that cannot be freely sold; such institu-
tions may thus be compelled to take an interest in managerial conduct."). 
283. B. KRIKORIAN, FIDUCIARY STANDARDS IN PENSION AND TRUST FUND MANAGE· 
MENT 225 (1989). 
284. ld. at 243-45. 
285. Joint Statement by Depanments of Labor and Treasury on Pension Investments. 6 
Pens. Plan Guide (CCH) ~ 23,770R (Jan. 31, 1989) (confirming that ERISA does not require 
plan managers to automatically tender shares held by the plan to capture any premium repre-
sented by a tender offer). 
286. See, e.g .. Gilroy & Nelson, The Reactions of Institutional Investors to Shareholder Ini-
tiatives and Management Defensive Proposals, inK. EPPLER & T. GILROY, THE PROXY MA-
CHINERY-SOLICITATIONS AND CONTESTS INVOLVING CORPORATE CONTROL ISSUES 959 
apps. C & D (1988) (examples of typical proxy voting protocols). 
287. Shared cost research is available through groups such as the Council of Institutional 
Investors, IRRC, Analysis Group, Inc., and Institutional Shareholder Services, Inc. 
288. See supra text accompanying notes 283-84. 
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contacts, they are well situated to assemble, at minimum cost, voting groups 
comprised of their peer institutions. 
Thus, it is no longer necessarily true that shareholders will not vote, or 
will not vote against the status quo. Rather, it is more likely that institu-
tional investors, granted a practical means of nominating and electing their 
directoral choices, will exercise that option sparingly and for demonstrable 
strategic reasons. 289 
4. An Uninhibited Market for Corporate Control Would More 
Efficiently Correct Problems of Poor Board Performance 
According to contractarians, investors who purchase common shares in 
public companies contract away many of their ownership rights in exchange 
for liquidity. This theory assumes that the price paid for shares reflects a 
discount for the possibility that incumbent management will shirk their re-
sponsibilities or engage in self-dealing, 290 and also for the fact that by choos-
ing to invest in a public, rather than a closely-held company, investors have 
relinquished their right to nominate directoral candidates or to effectively 
monitor those elected. If these shareholders later become dissatisfied with 
management's performance, they can adequately protect their interests 
either by selling their shares or by initiating a shareholders' derivative ac-
tion.291 Alternatively, when ineffective management sufficiently devalues a 
corporation's shares to render it a target for takeover, dissatisfied sharehold-
ers can turn to the market for corporate control. Eventually, this process 
will lead to more competent substitutes replacing the non-performing 
managers. 292 
These characterizations of the corporate world invite many responses. 
Practical considerations, especially applicable to293 institutional investors, 
289. A survey of institutional investors conducted in 1990 found that as many as 33% of 
them would consider nominating at least one board candidate under certain circumstances. J. 
BIERSACH, VOTING BY INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS ON CO.RPORATE GOVERNANCE ISSUES IN 
THE 1990 PROXY SEASON 9 ( 1990). 
290. E.g., Fischel, The "Race to the Bottom'' Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments 
in Delaware's Corporation Law. 76 Nw. U.L. REv. 913, 918-19 (1982). 
291. Fischel, supra note 234, at 1277 n.63 (because of the liquidity of the capital markets, 
the "voice" option is irrelevant to shareholders in public companies); Comment, supra note 
235, at 156 (citing Manne, The "Higher Criticism" of the Modern Corporation, 62 COLUM. L. 
REV. 399, 410 (1962)). 
292. Fischel, supra note 290, at 919. 
293. An institutional investor's sale of a block of shares in a single nonperforming company 
might result in a substantial price depression. See generally Dent, supra note 257, at 906 (col-
lective abandonment of a security by a number of institutions would fun her depress the price). 
Further, an institutional investor's sale of shares in every company which behaves unaccept-
ably, for example by adopting a poison pill, would leave that investor with no place to go. 
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limit the use of the Wall Street Rule294 and the courts to redress managerial 
misconduct. The market for corporate control is decidedly imperfect, limit-
ing its usefulness as a mechanism of managerial discipline. 295 Control trans-
actions only occur where the projected benefits of the transfer substantially 
outweigh the transaction costs incurred. Moreover, state anti-takeover stat-
utes, various corporation-specific defensive maneuvers, threatened applica-
tion of antitrust laws, and the decline in funding sources for financing 
control purchases have substantially impaired the market's efficiency. More 
importantly, the market for corporate control may prove particularly unsat-
isfactory as a mechanism for replacing one or more corporate directors when 
a complete transfer of control is neither appropriate nor desirable. Why 
should investors be forced to choose between no change and total change in 
the composition of a corporate board when a partial change may be enough? 
The same theorists who advocate reliance on the market for corporate 
control supported managers over shareholders in the 1988 debate over the 
dual class recapitalization, or "one share/one vote," issue.296 These theo-
rists argued that shareholders definitionally lack the expertise and access to 
information enjoyed by management and, accordingly, cannot easily grasp 
complex strategic proposals. Consequently, these theorists claimed that de-
creasing or eliminating the traditional role of shareholders in corporate gov-
ernance could act to economically benefit these shareholders. 297 
The notion that shareholders would be "better off" without the costly in-
trusions of the voting process and that corporations should consequently re-
deem that portion of their shareholders' equity which represents the suffrage 
right is understandably seductive to managers. This is especially true where, 
294. See, e.g., Paramount Comms., Inc: v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990) (approv-
ing Time Inc.'s defensive acquisition of Warner Communications resulting in a combined share 
value of $125, notwithstanding the presence of a responsible bidder willing to pay $200 per 
share in cash for unencumbered shares of Time Inc.). 
295. Coffee, Regulating the Market for Corporate Control: A Critical Assessment of the 
Tender Offer's Role in Corporate Governance, 84 CoLUM. L. REv. 1145, 1211-12 (1984); Dent, 
supra note 257, at 887-89; Eisenberg, New Modes of Discourse in the Corporate Law Literature. 
52 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 582, 589-90 ( 1985); Eisenberg, Shortcomings of the Arguments 
Against Modernizing Corporate Law, 9 DEL J. CORP. L. 626, 627 (1984); Vagts, Challenges to 
Executive Compensation: For the Markets or the Courts?, 8 J. CORP. L. 231, 235-36 (1983). 
296. The result of this consideration was the Commission's adoption of Rule 19c-4, 17 
C.F.R. § 240.19c-4 (1988), which a court later rejected on the ground that it exceeds the Com-
mission's authority. The Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
297. But see Gordon, supra note 261, at 11-12. Gordon argues that advocates of dual class 
recapitalization overlook the influence of managerial opportunism and discount, without sup-
porting evidence, the efficiency of the market in conveying and evaluating information. /d. at 
12. Moreover, he contends that the arguments challenging the one share/one vote rule under-
estimate the expertise of many institutional investors to evaluate management's claims and 
proposals. /d. at 47. 
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as in the case of the prototypical dual class recapitalization, the price offered 
for the redemption may be less than the present value of the votes fore-
gone. 298 Economic theorists, however, are less self-interested than execu-
tives in the outcome of the one share/one vote debate and thus more difficult 
to defend. 
Whatever the validity of the theorists' patronizing arguments, the con-
trary position, advocated by many investors, 299 makes clear that the right to 
vote, even when attenuated from the more direct economic benefits of share 
ownership and even when control is not in question, is an asset of substantial 
value to its owners. The very process of recapitalization confirms the share-
holders' position when issuers offer increased dividends or other economic 
incentives in exchange for the forfeiture of the shareholder vote. 
Equity investors see the market for corporate control as only one of sev-
eral mechanisms of protection for their economic interests. They rely not 
only on a potential takeover bidder, but also on state and federal regulators, 
an active business press, aggressive investment analysts, and the collective 
response of other shareholders to maximize the value of their shares. None 
of these mechanisms provides an exclusive remedy and none is at all times 
superior. 
5. Transient Investor Coalitions Will Inevitably Select Directors with 
Short-term Vision 
One critic has suggested that the voting coalitions necessary to achieve the 
election of shareholder nominated directoral candidates tend to be short-
lived. 300 Moreover, shareholder nominated directors typically serve only for 
298. Quantifying the value of a shareholder vote, however, is difficult. One method com-
pares the price of publicly traded voting shares with otherwise equivalent non-voting shares. 
Using this method, researchers have found the presence of voting rights results in an average 
premium value of 5.4%. Fischel, supra note 29, at 144-46. Other methods have also been used 
to measure the value of the shareholder vote. See Bhagat & Brickley, Cumulative Voting: The 
Value of Minority Shareholder Voting Rights, 27 J.L. & EcoN. 339, 353-62 (1984) (charter 
amendments terminating cumulative voting result in abnormally negative reductions in share 
price); Jarrell & Poulsen, Dual-Class Recapitalizations as Antitakeover Mechanisms: The Re-
cent Evidence, 20 J. FIN. EcoN. 129, 149 (1988) (noting "significant negative abnormal stock 
price returns" averaging 2% immediately following the announcement of a dual class recapi-
talization) (1988); Warren, One Share, One Vote: A Perception of Legitimacy, 14 J. CoRP. L. 
89, 90 n.6 (1988). 
299. See SEC One Share, One Vote Rule a 'Great Victory' for Shareholders, 3 USA ADvo-
CATE No.8, at 3 (Aug. 1988) (recounting two years of lobbying by the the United Sharehold-
ers Association to persuade the SEC to adopt a one share/one vote rule); letter from CalPERS 
to Nancy Smith, reprinted in 134 CoNG. REC. S8281 (daily ed. June 21, 1988) (advocating a 
statutory one share/one vote guarantee). 
300. Reich, Corporate Accountability and Regulatory Reform, 8 HoFSTRA L. REV. 5 
(1979). 
HeinOnline -- 40 Cath. U. L. Rev. 87 1990-1991
1990] Shareholder Access To The Proxy Revisited 87 
a limited time. This results in decisionmaking "dominated by short-term 
immediate concerns at the expense of long-term policies. " 301 
In politics, memories are often short and passions run high. Exi-
gencies of the moment may overwhelm more sensible, incremental 
solutions. Thus legislators, regulatory agency administrators, and 
corporate directors and managers may aim for short-term results 
that immediately satisfy their constituencies and over which tem-
porary compromises can be negotiated, even though the solutions 
may not be as beneficial over the long term. 302 
Evidence exists that members of traditionally selected boards capitulate to 
short-term values, 303 and commentators in the last two years have increas-
ingly exhorted managers and directors to resist quick fixes and embrace the 
long-term view. 304 Whether the presence of one or more shareholder nomi-
nated directors on a corporate board would exacerbate existing decisional 
patterns is unclear. The assertion that shareholder nominated directors are 
likely to reject long-term strategies contradicts Lipton and Lowenstein, who 
argue that providing shareholder access to the proxy would encourage long-
term thinking and ultimately serve to retard hostile takeovers. 30~ 
There are, however, more effective means of curbing hostile takeovers. 
More importantly, granting institutional investors direct access to the proxy 
is likely to result in a decrease, rather than an increase, in anti-takeover be-
havior such as the approval of poison pills and preemptive business combina-
tions. 306 Nevertheless, the fact that these investors are likely to prefer 
market driven corporate policies30? over market inhibiting policies308 does 
not mean they will necessarily favor "short-term" policies prompting im-
pressive quarterly financial figures over "long-term" policies promoting 
steady value gain. 
Moreover, no reason exists to assume that a board which includes one or 
more members elected following nomination by institutional shareholders, 
rather than by the incumbent board, is any more likely as a group to focus on 
301. /d. at 26. 
302. /d. 
303. See, e.g., B. BURROUGHS & ] , HELYAR, BARBARIANS AT THE GATE 4-5 (1990) (not-
ing the preoccupation of CEO Ross Johnson and his board with RJR's "undervalued" stock 
price and the need to improve the company's quarterly financial figures). 
304. E.g .. J. l..oRSCH, supra note 237, at 188. 
305. See supra notes 134-45 and accompanying text. 
306. Martin Lipton has said that the new-found interest of institutional investors in corpo-
rate governance is really a disguise for the "movement to promote takeovers." Lenzner, 
Shareholders Get Tough-Institutional Funds Flex Their Muscles to Get Some Action, Boston 
Globe, May 4, 1989, at 60, col. 4. 
307. For example, the imposition of aggressive and unsentimental cost control measures. 
308. For example, the adoption of shark repellents. 
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short-term concerns. And there can be the additional safeguard of electing 
directors for extended terms. That is, one method of discouraging a short-
term mentality, both among management nominated and shareholder nomi-
nated directors, would be to adopt staggered boards with all the members 
serving two or three year terms. 309 
6. Empowering Institutional Investors May Ultimately Harm Their 
Constituents 
Those critical of shareholder access can argue that, by playing a direct 
role in nominating directoral candidates, shareholders may subject them-
selves to the coverage of the "controlling persons" provisions of the 1933 
and 1934 Acts, 310 or to assertions that they are board members and thus 
may be liable for short swing trading liabilities under Section 16(b) of the 
1934 Act. 311 These are not arguments against access to the proxy per se but 
a caution to those shareholders, especially institutional investors, who might 
seek to exercise their access rights. 
Institutional investors who nominate directoral candidates may take sev-
eral precautions. First, they should insulate themselves from information 
held confidentially by their nominees who are successfully elected.312 Sec-
ond, they should and easily can refrain from the kinds of domineering or 
manipulative behaviors which could lead to "controlling person" liability.313 
Third, they should understand that directors-regardless of the source of 
309. This approach, however, inhibits takeovers and the efficient operation of the market 
for corporate control. Massachusetts recently passed a law mandating staggered boards in 
response to the request of Norton Co., which was threatened with a takeover by a British 
raider. Foust & Smart, The Merger Parade Runs into a Brick Wall, Bus. WEEK, May 14, 
1990, at 38. Staggered boards do not inhibit tender offers for companies which do not have 
poison pills. They do inhibit control transfers undertaken by means of a proxy fight. 
310. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77o and 78t (1988). 
311. !d. § 78p(b); see also Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp., 406 F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1969) 
(Martin Marietta's CEO served on the board of Sperry Rand and was considered "deputized" 
to act on Martin Marietta's behalf, effectively rendering Martin Marietta a director, thus ex-
posing it to short-swing liability for corporate trading in Sperry Rand's stock). 
312. Lowenstein points out that: 
[I)t ought to be at least as possible for [institutional] investors to develop procedures 
like the Chinese Wall of investment bankers so that the information a director re-
ceives at board meetings does not become water fountain gossip back at the mutual 
fund offices. [In addition), it would always be available to investors to nominate 
business school deans, security analysts, industry specialists, and others who could 
represent shareholder interests effectively but whose knowledge would not be im-
puted to the investor. 
L. LOWENSTEIN, supra note 139, at 216. 
313. Cf Cameron v. Outdoor Resorts of Am., Inc., 608 F.2d 187, 194 (5th Cir. 1979) 
(liability based on fact that defendant, the corporation's president, controlled the daily opera-
tions of the business); Bernstein v. Crazy Eddie, Inc., 702 F. Supp. 962,979 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) 
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their nomination-are fiduciaries ·accountable to all shareholders and not 
only to those who were responsible for their initial noinination.314 The right 
to effectively nominate directoral candidates creates no right to compel 
directoral behavior and, prudently exercised, ought not result in liability. 
7. Shareholder Nominated Directors Will Bring No Demonstrable 
Improvement to Corporate Performance· 
The conservative observer could argue that there is no compelling need to 
impose a new system of directoral selection on public companies at this 
time. 315 The economy, even if soft, remains productive. There are signs that 
as a group, the boards of publicly held corporations are more sensitive to 
shareholder concerns than ever before. 316 Furthermore, as board composi-
tion shifts to include a larger proportion of "outside" directors, one can ex-
pect boards to act more decisively in the face of crisis and with greater 
(plaintiff states claim for controlling person liability where CEO is alleged to have been an 
instrumental decisionmaker for the corporation). 
314. Cf Weinberger v. UOP, 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983) (all directors, regardless of the 
source of their nomination, owe the corporation and all its shareholders an "uncompromising 
duty of loyalty"). 
315. Cf Fischel, supra note 234, at 1265-71 (arguing that no evidence exists that the status 
quo disadvantages shareholders); New York, Pennsylvania Funds Scrutinize Corporate Boards, 
61RRC CORP. GOVERNANCE BULL. 143 (Sept./Oct. 1989) (quoting the Chair of the Business 
Roundtable asserting that there is "zero correlation" between changes in traditional modes of 
corporate governance and improved corporate performance). Professor Lewis Solomon's em-
pirical review in 1978 of the aftermath of several court ordered changes in board composition 
concluded that the difference between the "ethos" and performance of the prelitigation and 
postlitigation boards was "imperceptible" and that proposals to shift control over directoral 
nomination from the CEO to some other entity were unlikely to result in any significant shift 
in governance patterns. Solomon, Restructuring the Corporate Board of Directors: Fond 
Hope-Faint Promise, 16 MICH. L. REV. 581, 600 (1978). Professor Victor Brudney also 
noted the potential shortcomings of relying on "independent" directors as agents of corporate 
change. Brudney, supra note 74, at 597. But see Baysinger & Butler, Corporate Governance 
and the Board of Directors: Performance Effects of Changes in Board Composition, I J. L., 
EcoN. & ORG. 101, 104 (1985) (finding that "board composition, in terms of the proportion of 
outside independent directors, has a mild [positive] effect on organizational performance, but 
that the effect is lagged"). 
316. See generally Taking Charge-Corporate Directors Start to Flex Their Muscle, Bus. 
WEEK, July 3, 1989, at 66. "[M]ore and more boards around the country have begun to watch 
out for shareholders as never before. In short, they are actually performing as they are, in 
theory, supposed t<>-but seldom have." /d. Many point to the experience of RJR Nabisco, 
Inc., as a vivid example of how modern boards can act for the benefit of shareholders when 
pressed to do so. Immediately prior to submitting management's proposal for a leveraged 
buyout, RJR Nabisco's CEO regularly treated the board of directors to lavish resort accommo-
dations, private jet transportation, profitable consulting contracts and other perquisites such as 
participation in nationally televised sporting events. B. BURROUGHS & J. HELYAR, supra note 
303, at 165-67. Nevertheless, the board ultimately declined to support management's bid for 
the company and sold it to an outside bidding group. 
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willingness, even in the absence of crisis, to challenge management ideas and 
stimulate greater corporate performance. 317 
Notwithstanding these reassurances, market participants and others con-
tinue to urge reform. Institutional investors exploit crisis situations318 and, 
where none exist, seek to create and participate in new advisory bodies 
which would assure them some access to otherwise uncommunicative boards 
of directors. 319 While market observers urge alterations in board organiza-
tion, 320 scholars pr~pose more radical solutions, including the dismantling of 
the proxy voting system and the removal of responsibility for directoral se-
lection from incumbent managers and incumbent boards. 321 There is a 
growing sense that the existing system of directoral selection fails to meet the 
market's needs. While that may not be a sufficient reason to embrace an idea 
repeatedly rejected for nearly 50 years, it does suggest that access to the 
proxy merits renewed consideration. This is especially true in light of cur-
rent efforts to make the capital markets of the European Communities more 
attractive to international investors. 322 If significant investors value access 
to the proxy and cannot acquire it in the course of domestic securities 
purchases, they may look elsewhere. 
B. The Affirmative Case 
As previously examined, several reasons exist for granting significant 
shareholders the right to nominate directoral candidates: it will energize 
board decisionmaking practices; bring balance to any movement toward 
management entrenchment; and provide fiduciary institutions the opportu-
nity to bring special expertise to the aid of poorly performing companies. 
Another potential benefit of shareholder access to the proxy is that it 
would provide a mechanism by which an attentive shareholder could initiate 
action in a cost effective manner, thus preventing harm to the corporation 
317. See Weisbach, Outside Directors and CEO Turnover, 20 J . FIN. EcoN. 431 (1988) 
(suggesting firms with outsider dominated boards are more likely to replace the CEO in the 
face of poor stock performance, and to do so more quickly, than firms with insider dominated 
boards, thus resulting in increased share value). 
318. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
319. See supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
320. E.g. , Knowlton & Millstein, Can the Board of Directors Help the American Corpora-
tion Earn the Immortality It Holds So Dear?, in J.R. MEYER & J.M. GUSTAFSON, THE U.S. 
BUSINESS CORPORATION-AN INSTITUTION IN TRANSITION 184 (1988) (recommending that 
one of the outside directors, rather than the CEO, routinely serve as chairman of the board); 
Lipton, An End to Hostile Takeovers and Short-Termism, THE FIN. TIMES, June 27, 1990, at 
21 (recommending quinquennial board elections). 
321 . See infra notes 362-77 and accompanying text. 
322. See. e.g .. Europe Shows Leadership on Shareholder Rights, 5 USA ADVOCATE No. 8, 
at 5 (Aug. 1990). 
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before it occurs. The harm averted may include friction between capital 
providers and capital expenders. It may also include less than optimal 
modes of directoral decisionmaking, inattention to constituency demands, 
and simple self-dealing. Effective prophylactic action, however, will likely 
occur only if there exists a means of distributing the costs among the 
beneficiaries. 
Currently, shareholders are entitled to share the cost with other share-
holders of self-initiated behavior in only three settings: (I) a shareholder 
derivative suit, where their costs may be reimbursed and their attorneys' fees 
effectively spread among all shareholders if they p~evail;323 (2) a proxy con-
test where their costs may be reimbursed only if they succeed in effecting a 
transfer of control and a shareholder vote authorizes reimbursement;324 and 
(3) circulating policy proposals to other shareholders, where they may share 
the cost if those proposals are among the limited categories authorized by 
the SEC's shareholder proposal rule. ns 
In the first situation, the derivative suit, the ability to spread the cost of 
reform depends on a finding that the corporation experienced some harm, 
that the litigating shareholder detected and corrected the harm, and that the 
corporation benefitted from the correction. 326 In the second situation, the 
proxy contest, again the corporation must have experienced harm sufficient 
to generate a perceived need for change in control. Given their expense, 
proxy contests are undertaken only in extreme cir<~umstances. In the third 
situation, the shareholder proposal, harm to the corporation need not be 
apparent before the proposal is advanced. Regulatory limitations on the use 
of shareholder proposals, however, result in many important issues never 
323. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970). 
324. Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine and Airplane Corp., 309 N.Y. 168, 128 N.E.2d 291 
(1955). 
325. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text. 
326. See, e.g., Mills, 396 U.S. at 389-97 (corporate benefit found in plaintiff's proof of inad-
equate shareholder communication); Reiser v. Del Monte Properties Co., 605 F.2d 1135 (9th 
Cir. 1979) (same); Swanson v. American Consumer Indus., Inc., 517 F.2d 555 (7th Cir. 1975) 
(same); Ramey v. Cincinnati Enquirer, Inc., 508 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1974) (corporate benefit 
found in plaintiff's delay of a risky repurchase plan permitting renegotiation); Denney v. Phil-
lips & Buttorfl" Corp., 331 F.2d 249 (6th Cir. 1964) (corporate benefit found in rescission of a 
corporate purchase of shares at an inflated price); Milstein v. Werner, 58 F.R.D. 544 
(S.D.N. Y. 1973) (corporate benefit found in modification of an employee stock purchase plan 
requiring employees to pay a higher price for their shares); Tanzer v. Huffines, 345 F. Supp. 
279 (D. Del. 1972) (corporate benefit found in the removal of management accused of misap-
propriating corporate assets); Berger v. Amana Soc'y, 135 N.W.2d 618 (Iowa 1965) (corporate 
benefit found in the nullification of a charter amendment). 
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reaching the corporate ballot. 327 In addition, shareholder proposals are non-
binding. 328 One might argue that this arrangement encourages litigation or 
outright proxy fights as the only meaningful mechanisms of shareholder ex-
pression, rather than encouraging such expression at a prophylactic stage, 
and that it prohibits timely and preventive shareholder expression with re-
spect to many economically important issues. Shareholder access to the 
proxy provides an alternative and constructive means of addressing potential 
harm before it occurs. 
There is one final re~on supporting shareholder access to the proxy for 
purposes of directoral nomination. Studies have shown that competition for 
board positions stimulates an increase in share value.329 Though these stud-
ies focused on the traditional proxy contest with independent solicitations 
and a separate proxy ballot for the insurgents, competition for board posi-
tions which occurs in other forms, such as through the use of a common 
ballot, may have similar, albeit less dramatic, results. Competition invites 
the market's attention and, more often than not, its respect. 
C Logistical Issues Presented by Shareholder Access Proposals 
Several logistical issues require consideration in connection with share-
holder access to the proxy proposals. These issues are best characterized by 
the following questions: (1) who should have standing as a nominator under 
an access to the proxy rule; (2) if standing is based upon some minimum 
level of share ownership, is the preferential treatment thereby created imper-
missible; (3) should shareholders be permitted to aggregate their shares to 
satisfy the ownership requirement; ( 4) if shareholders are permitted to aggre-
gate their shares to satisfy the ownership requirement, should the existing 
restrictions on "solicitation" govern the process of assembling the nominat-
ing group; (5) what restriction, if any, should be placed on the number of 
nominees which can be put forward by a nominating group; (6) if an entitled 
327. In particular, executive compensation, employee relations, and environmental policies 
all fall within the "ordinary business operations" exclusion to the shareholder proposal rule. 
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(7) (1990). 
328. See Valente & Rose, Santa Fe Southern Faces Thorny Issue of Whether to Accept Vote 
on Poison Pill. Wall St. J., May 26, 1988, at 14, col. I (shareholder proposal to rescind a poison 
pill passed with majority support; board considered whether to follow shareholder wishes or 
ignore them). 
329. Cf Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 259, at 395. "[V]oting contests produce price 
increases-presumably reflecting real increases in the value of the firm-whether or not they 
lead to changes in control. The price increase takes place when the market learns of the con-
test, and it persists even if the insurgents are defeated." /d. at 407 (footnote omitted); see also 
Dodd & Warner, On Corporate Governance: A Study of Proxy Contests, II J. FIN. EcoN. 401, 
435 (1983) ("[t]he positive share price performance holds for contests where the dissidents fail 
to capture majority control of the board as well as those where the incumbents are ousted."). 
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shareholder nominates one or more directoral candidates, is the shareholder 
subject to rule 14a-ll governing election contests; and (7) assuming a share-
holder is granted access to the proxy for purposes of making a nomination, 
does that right include the right to promote the candidate and "electioneer" 
on the face of the proxy statement or elsewhere? 
1. Standing 
Many would argue that the mere ownership of stock on a given record 
date should not afford a shareholder access to the corporate proxy state-
ment, or even the right to vote, when the shareholder may have purchased 
the stock days, or hours, before and may resell the stock days, or hours, 
later. 330 Arbitrageurs, for example, or program traders would be poor can-
didates for status as nominators. 
One might argue that, unlike long-term oriented fundamental stock pick-
ers, these traders would have no interest in nominating directoral candidates 
because the costs of finding and enlisting them would outweigh any short-
term gain resulting from their election. Therefore, there is no need to con-
sider them in crafting an access to the proxy regulation. Concerns about 
transient influence on corporate governance, however, are legitimate. There 
is some value in limiting a meaningful role in corporate decisionmaking to 
those with some institutional memory. 331 The SEC's shareholder proposal 
rule recognizes that even an insignificant role in corporate governance ought 
to require some proof of durational share ownership. 332 A comparable dura-
tiona] ownership requirement for shareholders seeking access to the proxy 
for purposes of directoral nomination not only would bring symmetry to 
shareholder initiated governance measures, but also would create an addi-
tional incentive for long-term holding. Any workable access proposal, like 
the rule l4a-8 shareholder proposal rule, should include a requirement that 
any nominator demonstrate a minimum durational ownership of one year 
and continuous ownership through the date of the annual meeting. 
330. "A CEO of a major corporation was heard to ask, in the course of a tirade against 
'raiders,' 'Can you apply the word "Owner" to a 26-year old pension-fund trader sitting at his 
CRT screen and trying to out-perfotm the woman down the hall?'" Conard, supra note 275, 
at 167. 
331. Cf L. LoWENSTEIN, supra note 139, at 194 ("[I]t is silly to pretend that in-and-out 
investors have much to contribute to the market or to the companies whose shares they so 
briefly hold."). 
332. Cf 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(a)(1) (1990) (a proponent of a shareholder proposal must 
hold the securities for at least one year and shall continue to own such securities through the 
date on which the meeting is held). 
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2. The Share Ownership Threshold 
A minimum ownership requirement of $1000 or 1% of market value, 
whichever is less, 333 like the durational ownership requirement discussed 
above, would create symmetry in matters of ballot access. An ownership 
requirement this low, however, would freely grant access to the ballot to 
many shareholders with miniscule holdings, thus trivializing the nominating 
process. This was one of the recurring concerns about earlier access propos-
als, which later proposals such as Lipton's and Lowenstein's and the recent 
congressional bills have attempted to address. A workable access rule 
should set the threshold ownership requirement much higher than is appro-
priate for shareholder proposals, in the range of $1 million to $5 million or 3 
to 5% of the outstanding voting shares, whichever is less.334 
Any access proposal containing a minimum ownership requirement re-
sults in treating some shareholders preferentially to other holders of the 
same class of shares. The SEC does not permit management to favor certain 
shareholders over others of the same class in the context of corporate self-
tender offers. 33s How can it permit such favoritism in the context of an 
election for the board of directors? While this treatment may seem unfair, it 
is not unlawful. States have recognized that shareholders with large hold-
ings may be treated differently, generally more harshly, than shareholders 
with smaller holdings. 336 The SEC has also approved preferential treatment 
for shareholders based upon their holdings in the context of rule 14a-8.337 
3. Aggregation 
The shareholder proposal rule does not permit aggregation of shares to 
meet the $1,000 or 1% of market value ownership requirement. Rather, rule 
14a-8 requires the proponent to be the beneficial owner of the required 
number of securities. The same rule could apply to access to the proxy for 
purposes of directoral nomination, but it should not. Prohibiting aggrega-
tion by shareholders would effectively limit access to a very small universe of 
investors whose views may already carry substantial weight with incumbent 
333. The $1000 or I% of market value is the minimum ownership required of shareholders 
wishing to bring shareholder proposals under Rule 14a-8. See supra note 14 and accompany-
ing text. 
334. Note that some high capitalization companies have thousands of shareholders with 
holdings in excess of $500,000, which would render proposals with ownership thresholds be-
low that figure unworkable. 
335. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-4(f)(8) (1990) (the "all-holders" rule). 
336. See Buxbaum, The Internal Division of Powers in Corporate Governance, 73 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1671, 1693-94 (1985) (recounting case and statutory law which imposes special restric-
tions on large holders). 
337. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
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management. Permitting aggregation, while technically more complicated, 
is the better choice; it would broaden the availability of access to effective 
coalition builders. 
4. The "Solicitation" Problem 
Section 14(a) prohibits the solicitation of proxies unless that solicitation 
complies with the SEC proxy ruies. 338 These rules describe the required 
form of proxy339 and the information which must accompany or precede 
it. 340 The SEC defines solicitation to include "any request for a proxy."341 
Courts construe this definition broadly, including within its ambit fundrais-
ing letters mailed in anticipation of future collective shareholder action, 342 
newspaper advertisements critical of management, 343 and statements made 
to the financial press advocating the breakup of a public company.344 Some 
courts have held "solicitation" to include the dissemination to shareholders 
of any writings, whether or not they strictly solicit a proxy, which are "part 
of 'a continuous plan' intended to end in solicitation."345 This suggests that 
contacts between shareholders with the short-term objective of pooling their 
shares to satisfy the ownership threshold necessary to nominate a directoral 
candidate, but with the long-term objective of encouraging the casting of 
proxy ballots for that candidate, may, under existing law, constitute unlaw-
ful "solicitation." These restrictions only apply when the shareholder con-
tacts more than ten other shareholders. 346 Therefore, if eleven or more 
shareholders are required to satisfy a share ownership requirement for plac-
ing a directoral nomination on the ballot, the mere act of putting together a 
nominating group could result in lhibility under the securities laws. A work-
able access rule will require an amendment to rule 14a-1 to exclude from the 
definition of solicitation the mere formation of a nominating group. 
338. 15 U.S.C. § 78(n) (1988). 
339. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(a)(l)-(3) (1990). 
340. /d. § 240.14a-5. 
341. /d. § 240.14a-l(l)(l)(i). 
342. Canadian Javelin Ltd. v. Brooks, 462 F. Supp. 190 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); In re First Home 
Inv. Corp. of Kan., Inc., 368 F. Supp. 597 (D. Kan. 1973). 
343. Long Island Lighting Co. v. Barbash, 779 F.2d 793 (2nd Cir. 1985). 
344. Trans World Corp. v. Odyssey Partners, 561 F. Supp. 1315, 1320 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). 
345. Studebaker Corp. v. Gittlin, 360 F.2d 692, 696 (2d Cir. 1966); see also SEC v. Okin, 
132 F.2d 784, 786 (2d Cir. 1943). Communications among a shareholder group which under-
stands from the outset that each member is opposed to the proposed corporate action do not 
constitute a "solicitation." Scott v. Multi-Amp Corp., 386 F. Supp. 44, 73 (D. N.J. 1974). 
Likewise, communications with the purpose of encouraging shareholders to lobby manage-
ment where no proxy submission is anticipated do not rise to the level of "solitication." Chris-
Craft Indus., Inc. v. Independent Stockholders Comm., 354 F. Supp. 895 (D. Del. 1973). 
346. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2(b)(1) (1990). 
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5. Capping the Number of Nominees Which Any Nominating Group 
May Propose 
Many would argue that raiders and others seeking a complete turnover in 
the control of the board should be excluded from utilizing an access to the 
proxy regulation. Instead, they should be compelled to use separate solicita-
tion documents to maintain the integrity of the corporate proxy and mini-
mize shareholder confusion. While raiders are unlikely to seek access under 
the rules proposed in this Article, 347 it is reasonable that they should be 
prohibited from doing so. As a mechanism for differentiating between long-
term investors seeking to contribute to the existing board and those seeking 
to seize control of the board, there should be a cap on the number of 
directoral candidates which a nominator or nominating group may advance 
in a single proxy. A limit of three nominees is reasonable. Admittedly, the 
cap will not always effectively exclude nominators who are seeking a change 
in control, 348 but it is an evenhanded way of limiting misuse of the access 
privilege. 
6. Application of the "Election Contest" Rule 
Traditionally, when management proposes a slate of directoral candidates 
and shareholders advance a counter slate, the insurgents prepare their own 
proxy solicitation and a separate proxy ballot. Rule 14a-ll governs this 
form of "election contest"349 and requires that prior to undertaking a proxy 
solicitation, the insurgent group must first clear with the Commission any 
solicition material intended for shareholder distribution. 35° Furthermore, 
the group must supply on Schedule 14B personal and financial information 
concerning their nominees. 351 
Nothing in rule 14a-ll requires an insurgent group to solicit by means of 
an independent proxy solicitation and separate proxy ballot. Presumably, 
insurgents could merely attend the annual meeting, make a nomination from 
the floor, and seek votes from the few shareholders present. Alternatively, 
they could limit their proxy solicitation to no more than ten other sharehold-
ers, in which case--absent fraud-they would not subject themselves to the 
347. See infra text following note 353. 
348. Occasionally, a significant change in control can be effectuated by the election of three 
or fewer directoral candidates. For example, in 1990, Centaur Partners Group led a proxy 
contest for three board seats at National Intergroup, Inc., and won, leading to the decision-
opposed by the previous board-to liquidate the company. Kramer, National Intergroup to 
Take Bids for Firm, INVESTOR's DAILY, Aug. 23, 1990, at 21. Centaur's proxy contest cost it 
$4.2 million in solicitation expenses. /d. 
349. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-ll (1990). 
350. /d. § 240.14a-ll(e). 
351. /d.§ 240.14a-ll(c). 
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oversight of the SEC. 352 Because premeeting solicitation of many sharehold-
ers is necessary to secure an adequate vote, persons engaged in a contest for 
control subject themselves to the demands of the costly preclearance proce-
dures. Shareholder access to the proxy would provide an alternative to the 
election contest rule. 
The "common ballot" option proposed in this Article would be exclusive. 
That is, a nominator choosing to place a nominee on the corporate ballot 
would be foreclosed from later circulating a separate ballot. He would also 
be foreclosed from distributing written solicitation materials separate from 
the corporate proxy statement. 
Selecting the common ballot option would subject the nominator to at 
least one substantial disability. Votes cast by shareholders would be re-
turned to management's agent, rather than to the nominator. Advocates of 
confidential proxy voting argue that when managers receive proxy cards, 
they commonly resolicit those shareholders who voted against manage-
ment's recommendations. 353 By contrast, those who oppose management's 
view cannot resolicit because they, unlike management, are unable to ascer-
tain who has rejected their proposals. 
Because of the importance of monitoring incoming ballots, thus permit-
ting resolicitation of targeted shareholders, investors pursuing a change in 
control will always select the separate ballot option under rule 14a-ll. 
Others, such as institutional investors seeking to alter the composition of the 
board by one or two members, might well select the common ballot option to 
reduce their solicitation costs. Regardless of which option they chose, nomi-
nators and their candidates would bear the responsibility for compliance 
with disclosure and antifraud rules. 354 Either option would require nomi-
nees to file with the SEC the information now required on Schedule 14B. 
7. Electioneering 
Permitting a shareholder to include a biographical description of a 
directoral nominee in a company's proxy material is quite different from per-
mitting that shareholder to explain the rationale for presenting the nominee 
to other shareholders and for preferring that nominee over one or more of 
the board-nominated candidates. Such explanations presumably would in-
volve criticism of the existing board. 
352. See supra note 346 and accompanying text. 
353. See letter from CaiPERS to Nancy Smith (Sept. 30, 1987) (noting management prac-
tice of resolicitation), reprinted in 134 CONG. REC. S8281 (1988). 
354. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1990). 
HeinOnline -- 40 Cath. U. L. Rev. 98 1990-1991
98 Catholic University Law Review (Vol. 40:37 
The existing shareholder proposal rule permits proponents to include, 
alongside the text of their proposal, a supporting statement355 which, within 
reason, may incorporate personal invective and opinion. The SEC, however, 
prohibits proponents from attacking management personally, for example, 
by seeking removal of individual directors3s6 or by advancing a proposal 
"counter to a proposal to be submitted by the [management] at the meet-
ing."3s7 Apparently, the theory is that official corporate documents should 
be decorous and speak with one voice. Statements impugning the quality of 
incumbent management, or challenging their st~ategic vision, only confuse 
shareholders and ought to appear elsewhere. 
This theory not only underestimates those shareholders who choose to 
vote, it also penalizes substantial shareholders seeking to communicate with 
others concerning the need to improve the board. The SEC should permit 
advocacy in support of directoral nominations to appear on corporate proxy 
statements to the same extent they now permit advocacy for shareholder 
proposals. This would- serve the dual goals of providing full disclosure to 
investors and a more enlightened forum for the exchange of ideas among 
shareholders. Specifically, the SEC should permit shareholder nominators 
to make the case in support of their nominees, and against one or more of. 
the incumbent candidates, on the face of the proxy statement-subject to 
existing limitations on hyperbole358 and defamation. Management, of 
course, should be permitted to respond in kind. 
VI. A PROPOSAL FOR A LIMITED ACCESS TO THE PROXY REGULATION 
The SEC should adopt, as part of an overall review of the federal proxy 
rules or otherwise, a regulation substantially similar to that proposed in The 
Corporate Takeover Reform Act of 1989.3!19 This regulation would permit a 
shareholder or shareholder group owning $1 million or 3% of the market 
value, whichever is less, of a public company's voting stock to nominate up 
to three directoral candidates. In addition, the candidates' credentials would 
appear on the corporate proxy statement, and their names on the official 
355. /d. § 240.14a-8(b)(l). 
356. General Pub. Uti!., SEC No-Action Letter (Feb. 10, 1982) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, 
Noact file) (proposal recommending removal of four officers excluded from the ballot). 
357. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(9) (1990). 
358. See, e.g .. Westland Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (Sept. 10, 1982) (LEXIS, Fedsec 
library, Noact file) (requiring proponent to label opinions as such and to delete unsupported 
statements such as: "nominations to the Board of Directors of the Company have been con-
trolled by existing directors," "shareholders of the Company have expressed a strong willing-
ness to nominate and elect new representatives to the Board," and "existing directors have 
controlled the election process"). 
359. See supra note 162 and accompanying text. 
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corporate ballot. Owners whose shares are counted in the nominating group 
must have owned their shares at least one year prior to the scheduled annual 
meeting. 
Access to the proxy is preferable to alternative proposals, particularly to 
the shareholder advisory committee proposals advanced by some sharehold-
ers during the 1990 proxy season. 360 It is similarly preferable to the propo-
sal recently advanced by Professor George V. Dent, Jr., advocating a shift in 
control over proxy solicitation from incumbent management to a committee 
comprised of a corporation's largest shareholders. 361 
A. The Shareholders' Advisory Committee 
Creating a shareholders' advisory committee will only add an unneeded 
layer to the process of corporate governance, which is already characterized 
by a proliferation of special committees, advisory committees, and other task 
groups which tend to diffuse responsibility for decisionmaking. In addition, 
it is difficult to tell how many shareholders will find it worth the cost to 
participate in meetings designed to convey advice and counsel to a body, the 
board of directors, which is free to disregard it, and over which they have no 
enforcement powers. Conversely, it is also hard to tell how much credence 
the board is likely to give the recommendations of an advisory body when 
the advisors, unlike the decisionmakers, run no risk of personal liability and 
little risk of public opprobrium. The advisory committee proposals may ap-
peal to their sponsors as a way· of insulating institutional investors from real 
responsibility, while guaranteeing that they will receive some increased at-
tention from management. They are unlikely, however, to improve corpo-
rate performance. 
B. Professor Dent's Proposal 
Professor Dent advocates a system in which the ten to twenty largest 
shareholders of a public company would assume control over the nomina-
tion of all directoral candidates and the administration of the proxy voting 
system. Dent argues that institutional investors willingly will assume many 
of the costs of such a system362 and that his proposal is preferable to access 
to the proxy. Dent asserts that the strength of his proposal lies in its avoid-
360. See, e.g., CalPERS proposal to shareholders !Jf Avon Products, Inc., supra note 91 
and accompanying text. 
361. Dent, supra note 257, at 907. 
362. /d. at 908. 
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ance of "open opposition" to incumbent management and in the "punish-
ment" of active shareholders which might follow. 363 
Dent's proposal, while provocative, is flawed. Many institutional inves-
tors want nothing to do with directoral selection. 364 As for those that might, 
consider an investor such as CalPERS. As a largely indexed fund with hold-
ings between . 7 and 1.0% of the shares of approximately 3000 public compa-
nies, CalPERS is probably among the largest ten to twenty shareholders of 
several hundred companies. 365 It is unrealistic to assume that a publicly 
funded pension system, whose primary fiduciary obligation is to its benefi-
ciaries, would assume the task of actively managing the directoral selection 
processes of all these companies, regardless of the quality of their incumbent 
managements. 366 If given the power, CalPERS or other large investors are 
far more likely to target selectively specific corporations in which they be-
lieve a more balanced board would lead to improved performance. 367 
Furthermore, consider the other investors who are likely to be among the 
ten to twenty largest shareholders of a public company. Statistics suggest 
that some members of the board, including the CEO, management con-
trolled pension funds, and employee stock ownership plans, often fall within 
this group. 368 What is the point of overhauling the entire system of 
directoral selection, when many of the same players whose roles Dent criti-
cizes will simply reappear as influential members of the new nominating 
body? 
Dent favors the wholesale turnover of the directoral selection process 
from incumbent management to institutional investors, arguing that this 
would generate less contention than amending the existing system to provide 
limited shareholder access to the proxy.369 Shifting responsibility for the 
nomination of directors away from management and into the hands of large 
investors might eliminate the managerial pressure tactics which often ac-
363. /d. at 908-09. 
364. See Hollie, Activism Not Role for Firms, PENSIONS & INVESTMENT AGE, Oct. 2, 1989, 
at 17 (mutual fund managers "do not support the kind of activism that seeks to make changes 
in the boards," and accordingly do not seek, or want, a role in corporate governance). 
365. Telephone interview with Kayla J. Gillan, CalPERS Assistant General Counsel (May 
17, 1990). 
366. The prospect of assuming such responsibilities might inhibit investors from acquiring 
substantial blocks of shares. 
367. CaiPERS is governed by a Policy Statement which limits the fund's involvement in 
governance matters to those companies which are poor performers. Telephone interview with 
Kayla J. Gillan, CalPERS Assistant General Counsel (May 17, 1990). 
368. Jensen & Warner, The Distribution of Power Among Corporate Managers, Sharehold-
ers and Directors. 20 J. FrN. EcoN. 3, 6, table I (1988). 
369. Dent, supra note 257, at 908. 
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company a contested proxy issue. 370 The risk of abuse in a competitive vot-
ing system, however, is quite small. Though corporate managers possess 
some leverage over service providers and their own ESOP's and in-house 
pension funds, 371 they possess no leverage over consumer marketed mutual 
funds or public pension funds and are unlikely to influence their votes. Man-
agers' alleged influence over the ESOP's and pension funds of other compa-
nies372 is also overstated. To the extent that undue managerial influence on 
proxy voting exists, regulators should prohibit such conduct or require its 
disclosure rather than dismantle, as Dent suggests, the entire proxy voting 
system. 
Dent finally argues that any system in which someone other than incum-
bent management nominates less than a majority of the board inevitably re-
sults in the co-optation of the minority. 373 He recounts the dismal history of 
outside directors acquiescing to the wishes of management in such matters 
as executive compensation and anti-takeover strategies. 374 Recent evidence 
suggests Dent's cynicism about director independence may be misplaced, or 
at least that directoral acquiescence may be receding. Even hand picked 
boards sometimes demonstrate an ability to remain independent when con-
fronted with gross conflicts of interest or the need to remove a friend from 
office.37s In any event, Dent's assumption that a minority bloc of share-
holder-elected directors "would [in no event) be very effective"376 discounts 
modem learning about group dynamics and the abilities of a persuasive and 
persistent minority to effect change. 377 
370. See ]. HEARD & H. SHERMAN, CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN THE PROXY VOTING 
SYSTEM 44-45, 50-52 (1987) (recounting numerous incidents in which management attempted 
to direct the voting practices of banks, insurance companies, and fund managers with whom 
they did business). 
371. The latter funds may allocate no more than 10% of their assets to the sponsoring 
company's shares. 29 U.S.C. § 1107(a)(2) (1982). 
372. See] . HEARD & H. SHERMAN, supra note 370, at 53; L. LOWENSTEIN, supra note 
139, at 208 (describing letters between CEO's urging each other to influence or direct the vote 
of their pension fund managers). 
373. Dent, supra note 257, at 909. 
374. /d. at 900. 
375. See supra notes 316-17 and accompanying text. 
376. Dent, supra note 257, at 909. 
377. See. e.g .. Moscovici, Social Influence and Conformity. in THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL 
PsYCHOLOGY 347 (G. Lindzey & E. Aronson 3d ed. 1984) (group participants representing a 
minority viewpoint can be effective persuaders if they demonstrate commitment, an acceptable 
"behavioral style," consistency but not rigidity, and rely on current and "novel" information); 
Wall, Galanes & Love, supra note 258, at 32 ("[C]onftict that expands the oplions available to 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Twelve years ago, at the height of the shareholder democracy movement, 
the Supreme Court, in a decision striking down a state statute prohibiting 
certain forms of political lobbying by corporations, embraced the notion that 
"shareholder democracy" is real. 378 The Court found no rational justifica-
tion for enacting legislation with the stated intent of protecting minority 
shareholders from the expenditure of corporate funds in the pursuit of public 
policy choices personally offensive to them: 
Ultimately shareholders may decide, through the procedures of 
corporate democracy, whether their corporation should engage in 
debate on public issues. Acting through their power to elect the 
board of directors or to insist upon protective provisions in the cor-
poration's charter, shareholders normally are presumed competent 
to protect their own interests. 379 
The Delaware Supreme Court also gives substantial lip service to share-
holder democracy in the context of directoral election, if not in the context 
of other contests for control. 380 
As practiced today, the "power to elect the board of directors" is an illu-
sory one, just as the power of black voters to meaningfully participate in the 
election of state and local officials in the absence of a genuine role in the 
nomination process was held illusory in the historic "White Primary" 
cases.381 In the case of public suffrage, the Constitution ensures that voters 
will have an effective voice in the selection of their representatives, 382 includ-
a group and increases the motivational and involvement level of the members will enhance the 
quality of outcome."). 
One additional alternative to the access proposal is to leave well enough alone. I do not 
address that option here, but merely reiterate Lowenstein's point that access is an experiment 
worth trying. L. LOWENSTEIN, supra note 139, at 217-18. 
378. First Nat') Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978). 
379. /d. at 794-95 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). 
380. E.g., Saxon Indus., Inc v. NKFW Partners, 488 A.2d 1298 (Del. 1985) (shareholders 
may compel convening of shareholders meeting to replace directors, notwithstanding pen-
dency of Chapter II proceedings, given "the strong Delaware policy behind the free exercise of 
a stockholder's right to elect directors"); see also Stroud v. Grace, No. 10719 (Del. Ch. Nov. I, 
1990) (LEXIS, States library, DEL file) (bylaws circumscribing the right of shareholders to 
nominate directoral candidates held unlawful). 
381. E.g .. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) (state may not facilitate system in which 
black voters are excluded from straw vote conducted by local political organization, the 
"Jaybird Democratic Club," where, as a practical matter, only the candidate who won this 
straw vote would seek nomination in the "official" Democratic primary); Smith v. Allwright, 
321 U.S. 649 ( 1944) (state cannot exclude a voter from a party primary on the basis of race, 
where the primary is the sole means for certifying nominees for inclusion on the general elec-
tion ballot). 
382. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 580 (1964). 
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ing an opportunity to participate in· the selection of those candidates whose 
names will appear on the general election ballot. 383 No comparable protec-
tion exists for American shareholders. At best, they have been relegated to a 
ceremonial role in the governance of corporations. 384 
Recent court decisions have held that, with rare exceptions, corporate 
governance is the exclusive domain of the board of directors. 385 That being 
the case, the SEC should afford shareholders a practical means of challeng-
ing the makeup of the board, as it has afforded them a practical means of 
challenging or criticizing the board's policy decisions under Rule 14a-8, 
without requiring shareholders to undertake a costly all-out proxy fight. 
The SEC should adopt a limited access to the proxy rule for a limited 
category of shareholders. The object of this proposal is quite modest-to 
permit shareholders of demonstrated strength and fidelity to a public com-
pany to express directly and communicate a directoral preference to other 
shareholders. If shareholders' suffrage rights are to mean anything, this op-
tion should be made available for their use. 
383. The Court has recognized the primary election as an "integral part of the entire elec-
tion process." Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 735 (1974); see also Durkin v. Nat'l Bank of 
Olyphant, 772 F.2d 55, 59 (1985), which held that the statutory right to vote for bank direc-
tors includes the right to nominate directoral candidates: 
I d. 
We rest our holding . . . on the common sense notion that the unadorned right to cast 
a ballot in a contest for office, a vehicle for participatory decisionmaking and the 
exercise of choice, is meaningless without the right to participate in selecting the 
contestants. As the nominating process circumscribes the range of the choice to be 
made, it is a fundamental and outcome-determinative step in the election of office-
holders. To allow for voting while maintaining a closed candidate selection process 
thus renders the former an empty exercise. This is as true in the corporate suffrage 
context as it is in civic elections . . . . 
384. Buxbaum, supra note 336, at 1683. 
385. E.g., Paramount Comms., Inc. v. Time Inc., (1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 
(CCH) 1{94,514, at 93,284 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1989), affd, 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990). "The 
corporation law does not operate on the theory that directors . .. are obligated to follow the 
wishes of a majority of shares. In fact, directors, not shareholders, are charged with the duty 
to manage the firm." /d. 
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APPENDIX 
VOTER RESULTS ON MANAGEMENT AND SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS, 
SEPTEMBER 1, 1988 - AUGUST 31, 19891 
Votes 
Voter 
Company For Against Abstain Tumoutl 
A.G. Edwards 59.7 14.8 7.9 82.4 
59.4 15.1 7.9 82.4 
A.H. Belo 83.3 1.9 5.0 90.2 
AGS Computers 76.9 .4 .1 77.4 
Acuson 69.0 2.2 8.6 79.8 
61.1 9.6 9.1 79.8 
Adams Express 71.0 6.3 2.9 80.2 
Advanced Micro Dev. 69.1 11.9 5.0 . 86.0 
Advest Group 64.3 8.3 .5 73.1 
62.7 9.6 .7 73.0 
62.7 9.8 .6 73.1 
Affiliated Pub. 80.7 2.9 .1 83.7 
74.1 2.1 .1 76.3 
Airborne Freight 62.2 16.7 12.0 90.0 
Alexander & Baldwin 85.1 5.1 2.0 92.2 
83.6 6.3 2.1 92.0 
All tel 79.6 .9 .7 81.2 
Amdahl 69.9 2.4 .5 72.8 
America West A/L 59.4 6.4 19.1 80.4 
American Capital 94.4 2.2 .2 96.8 
American Cyanamid 70.5 3.4 1.1 75.0 
Ameritech 67.9 11.5 2.0 80.4 
Amgen 72.8 7.4 .3 80.5 
Anacomp 50.2 i6.8 15.7 82.7 
53.1 16.7 12.9 82.7 
Anthem Electronics 76.3 7.0 .2 83.5 
52.2 17.5 13.7 83.4 
I. Data taken from L. KRASNOW, VOTING BY INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS ON 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ISSUES IN THE 1989 PROXY SEASON 55-60 (1989). 
2. Voter turnout is calculated by the formula ( # of votes cast I # eligible to vote) x 100. 
Shortridge, Estimating Voter Participation. in ANALYZING ELECTORAL HISTORY 137 (J. 
Clubb, W. Flanigan & N. Zingale eds. 1981). 
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53.2 16.5 13.7 83.4 
Apache 66.4 5.0 1.8 73.2 
Apple Bank 61.2 13.3 .5 75.0 
Apple Computer 58.6 10.1 .4 69.1 
Applied Biosystems 67.0 9.1 10.0 86.1 
73.6 7.0 3.4 84.0 
72.1 5.7 5.7 83.5 
Arkla 80.6 3.3 1.1 85.0 
74.6 5.6 1.1 81.3 
Au gat 67.1 10.0 .3 77.4 
Aventek 82.4 2.2 1.3 85.9 
72J 4.4 1.2 77.9 
Avnet 70.6 9.8 1.3 81.7 
